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My Coworker, My Enemy: Solidarity,
Workplace Control, and the Class Politics of
Title VII
AHMED A. WHITE†
INTRODUCTION
Few statutes are as esteemed as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Celebrated by legal academics, lawyers,
activists, and liberals of every bent as a triumph for workers’
rights, the statute’s vision of a workplace purged of
discrimination is contested only by reactionaries and
ignorant, if occasionally well-meaning, libertarians. Last
year’s 50th anniversary of Title VII’s enactment occasioned
even greater affirmation, bringing forth a torrent of praise
for the law and fulsome commemoration of its role in opening
opportunities to minorities and women and broadly
improving employment practices and working conditions.1
Indeed, among liberals and progressives, the only consistent
† Professor of Law and Wolf-Nichol Fellow, University of Colorado School of Law.
I must thank the participants of the AALS 2014 Midyear Workshop on Next
Generation Issues in Sex, Gender, and the Law, as well as my colleagues here at
the University of Colorado for their many helpful criticisms and suggestions.
1. See Peter Baker, 50 Years Later, Obama Salutes Effects of Civil Rights Act,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/11/us/politics/50years-later-obama-salutes-passage-of-civil-rights-act.html?_r=1;
Legal
Highlight: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.
law.upenn.edu/live/news/5115-celebrate-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-civilrights#.VhL2fuxVikq (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). For an example of an event held
to celebrate the law, see Penn Law Celebrates the 50th Anniversary of the Civil
Rights Act, U. PA. L. SCH. (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/news/
5115-celebrate-the-50th-anniversary-of-the-civil-rights#.VhL2fuxVikq.

1061

1062

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

criticisms of Title VII are that it does not go far enough in
protecting workers from discrimination, and that its
procedures are often overly cumbersome.2 In its basic
substance and framework, the law remains sacrosanct.
In fact, Title VII is problematic in ways that neither its
strongest supporters nor its most vocal critics have managed
to grasp. Although this history has been ignored or forgotten
by the statute’s champions, Title VII was enacted in the face
of serious concerns on the part of unionists and other leftists
about the wisdom of its approach to the problem of workplace
inequality. These critics, who strongly supported the
extension of the new Civil Rights Act into the workplace,
nonetheless worried that Title VII’s conceptualization of
workplace inequality in terms of individual discrimination,
its reliance on private litigation, and its indifference to the
structural underpinnings of workplace inequality would
render the law ill-suited to effectively address the problem.
Instead, these critics favored a different approach that would
have oriented the law around the collective interests of
workers and addressed the problem of workplace inequality
by establishing an active and powerful federal agency,
interlinked with other agencies and initiatives, and charged
with instituting structural and collective reforms.
Unfortunately, this alternative approach was brushed aside.
As predicted by its critics from the left—and as other critics
2. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Lisa Barré-Quick & Shannon Matthew Kasley,
The Road Less Traveled: Obstacles in the Path of the Effective Use of the Civil
Rights Provision of the Violence Against Women Act in the Employment Context,
8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 415, 425-26 (1998); Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and
Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of Workplace Harassment,
88 GEO. L.J. 1, 7-11 (1999); Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual
Harassment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997); Tracy L. Gonos, A Policy Analysis of
Individual Liability–The Case for Amending Title VII to Hold Individuals
Personally Liable for Their Illegal Discriminatory Actions, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 265, 281 (1999); Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide
Meaningful Protection and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees:
Proposals for Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 628-31 (2000);
Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII
Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301 (1990); Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty
Years of Compromise: How the Caps on Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 249, 315-16 (2014).
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have since acknowledged—the regime that was enacted has
failed to rectify the problem of workplace inequality.3 Far
worse, in the hands of employers, courts, and civil rights and
feminist activists, Title VII has evolved in a fashion that
enhances employers’ authoritarian control of the workplace
while eroding the most crucial foundation of workers’ rights:
solidarity. It is, in key respects, an anti-worker law.
This critique of Title VII is a sympathetic one, at least to
the extent it is not motivated by a rejection of the values of
workplace equality or antidiscrimination. Nevertheless, the
argument developed in this Article is explicitly conceived as
a blunt challenge to the law’s class politics. Indeed, it is
directed not only at the law but also at liberal and progressive
supporters of Title VII who have consistently defended the
law’s virtues with scant regard for alternative approaches to
workplace inequality, and with little thought of how, in a
class society, the law might sacrifice values and interests
that are at least as important as those of racial and gender
equality, employment opportunity, and the like. More
broadly, this critique sees Title VII as a milestone in a
devolution of postwar liberalism marked by a wholesale
repudiation of serious concerns about class in a favor of a
debilitating focus on racial, gender, and other identities.
This critique has historical foundations. For it rests, at
the outset, on a review of the struggle for control between
employers and workers that has defined the workplace for
3. See, e.g., RUBEN J. GARCIA, MARGINAL WORKERS: HOW LEGAL FAULT LINES
DIVIDE WORKERS AND LEAVE THEM WITHOUT PROTECTION 64-84 (2012); Natalie
Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN.
L. REV. 97, 117-18, 152-53 (2010); E. Christi Cunningham, The Rise of Identity
Politics I: The Myth of the Protected Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases,
30 CONN. L. REV. 441, 448-49 (1998); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769,
879, 889-905 (2002). See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness:
A Critical Review of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases,
1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029 (1995); Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The
Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); Juan
F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994); Leticia M. Saucedo,
Intersectionality, Multidimenisioality, and Latino Immigrant Workers, and Title
VII, 67 SMU L. REV. 257 (2014); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998).
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more than a century and shaped the landscape on which Title
VII was conceived, enacted, and implemented. It shows how
the statute evolved in this context to advance a particularly
pernicious vision of employer control, described by one
scholar as a program of “bureaucratic control,” characterized
by the operationalization of employers’ interests in a system
of formal rules steeped in paternalistic rhetoric but
committed at root to the “institutionalization of hierarchical
power” at the expense of worker solidarity.4 This Article
shows how this vision of control emerged out of Title VII’s
concept of discrimination and its codification in individual
rights; and how it was realized in the context of seniority
rules and workplace harassment, where the law has both
mandated and inspired an unfortunate configuration of
employers as benefactors and guardians of workers, and
workers as each other’s adversaries.
Scholars have only approached the outermost edges of
this topic. In recent years especially, social and legal
historians have brought to light the class biases of the civil
rights movement, including the ways these biases affected
the enactment of Title VII.5 But none have explored the way
these politics have reflected themselves in the contemporary
workings of the statute. Similarly, quite a few scholars have
called attention to the problem of solidarity under Title VII,
albeit with a very different concern for how the law supports,
or might better support, racial and gender solidarity as
opposed to class solidarity.6 Others have explored the way
4. RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION
WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 21 (1979).

OF THE

5. See, e.g., JUDITH STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA: RACE,
ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM 69 (1998) [hereinafter STEIN,
RUNNING STEEL]; Risa L. Goluboff, “We Live's in a Free House Such as it is”: Class
and the Creation of Modern Civil Rights, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1977, 1979 (2003).
6. On the articulation of solidarity in terms of identity, see generally Kathryn
Abrams, Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (2010); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to
Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120
YALE L.J. 1278 (2011); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title
VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 79-82 (2002). On the
impulse to directly critique class solidarity as the enemy of identity, see, for
example, Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity in the
Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339 (1997).
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Title VII’s emphasis on discrete classifications of workers illserves those who do not fit neatly into these categories;7 how,
in practice, it tends to exclude “marginal” workers entirely;8
and how, in line with a different kind of paternalism, it joins
with other civil rights regimes in forcing workers into the role
of victims.9 But none of these scholars have examined Title
VII’s role in systematically undermining class solidarity, let
alone furthering a retrograde notion of employer sovereignty
in the balance. Indeed, by relentlessly criticizing unions and
the labor law in the course of defending Title VII and its
values, more than a few liberals have implicitly rejected the
concept of class solidarity as a valid social norm and
organizing principle.10 This Article takes a very different view
of workers and the workplace, emphasizing the centrality of
class solidarity to workers’ interests in a way that questions
not only the value of Title VII, but the premises of those
whose outlooks on law and policy either ignore the question
of class altogether or blithely subordinate class solidarity to
race, gender, and other identities.
Conceptually, this Article has roots in a broader
skepticism about the compatibility of social policies based in
individual rights and legalism with the collective interests of
workers, one that extends at least from the writings of the
young Karl Marx—who famously impeached the
emancipative claims of bourgeois rights in general—to
7. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989).
8. See generally GARCIA, supra note 3.
9. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 52-77 (1988).
10. For examples of this kind of scholarship and commentary, see, for example,
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: RACE, WORK, AND
THE LAW 162-68 (1977) [hereinafter HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM]; Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 211 (2002); Herbert Hill, The Problem of Race in
American Labor History, 24 REVS. AM. HIST. 189, 194-95 (1996) [hereinafter Hill,
The Problem of Race]; see also David E. Bernstein, Roots of the ‘Underclass’: The
Decline of Laissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation,
43 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (1993) [hereinafter Bernstein, Roots of the ‘Underclass’]
(discussing labor legislation’s oppression of immigrants and persons of color).
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contemporary commentary by Mary Ann Glendon—a
conservative legal scholar who nonetheless rightly
questioned the courts’ role in subordinating the “principle of
solidarity” to individual rights.11 To couch the thesis in yet a
different debate, this Article argues that what labor and
employment scholar Cynthia Estlund has called the
“[p]rivatization of [r]ights [e]nforcement” in the workplace is
actually at base a program for reifying employers’ power over
workers.12 From these vantages, this Article undertakes to
subject Title VII to the kind of frank criticism that leftist
scholars (including this author) have applied to the labor
law.13
Although this Article’s political concerns follow a
different line of leftist criticism, its critique of Title VII from
the standpoint of workers’ interests is similar to Vicki
Schultz’s 2003 article, The Sanitized Workplace. In this
important contribution, Schultz exposes the “neo-Taylorist
project of suppressing sexuality and intimacy in the
workplace” that grew out of the work of feminist reformers
and the efforts of human resource managers to realize their
vision of Title VII.14 In fact, Schultz’s critique of the sexual
sanitization of the workplace, which is useful in many ways,
hints at the way in which Title VII might undermine
workplace solidarity, although without ultimately pursuing
this question.15
A more direct inspiration for this Article is the work of
radical economist Richard Edwards, whose 1979 book,
Contested Terrain, provides an innovative and extremely
useful account of the ways employers asserted authority in
11. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
DISCOURSE 115 (1991).

OF

POLITICAL

12. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 333-34 (2004).
13. See, e.g., JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR
RELATIONS POLICY, 1947–1994 (2003) [hereinafter GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE]; Karl
E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1978).
14. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003)
[hereinafter Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace].
15. Id. at 2069.

2015]

MY COWORKER, MY ENEMY

1067

the workplace.16 Edwards gives theoretical clarity to the work
of social historians and labor relations scholars who have
depicted the struggle between workers and employers for
control of the workplace as a fundamental feature of modern
capitalism, and who see worker solidarity as a central point
of conflict in this struggle. He shows how, after surrendering
power to workers in the Depression Era and the decade that
followed, employers in the postwar period developed newer,
bureaucratized systems of workplace control that
undermined worker solidarity and preserved employers’
authority.17 Edwards’ notions of the origins and functions of
bureaucratic control is central to this Article.
In more immediate ways, the argument developed here
builds on the enterprising work of sociologists Frank Dobbin
and Lauren Edelman, and historian Judith Stein. Dobbin’s
and Edelman’s main contributions lay with their
explorations of how employers appropriated Title VII for
their own purposes, and how managers and “personnel
experts” played a crucial role in shaping the real meaning of
discrimination law in the workplace.18 Neither of these
scholars is especially concerned with class and class conflict
as such, let alone the implications of Title VII for worker
solidarity. Nevertheless, their work is useful in
understanding how the interests and aims of employers have
reflected themselves in the practical meaning of Title VII.
Stein’s critical rereading of the origins and early uses of Title
VII, which she explores in the context of industrial policy and
labor, is valuable not least because it is so sensitive to oftenignored questions of class and political economy.19 Even
16. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 4.
17. See id.
18. See FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 75-77, 98-100, 220-26
(2009); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1535 (1992)
[hereinafter Edelman, Legal Ambiguity]; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity
Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589 (2001)
[hereinafter Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric]; Lauren B. Edelman et al.,
Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace,
27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 511, 529 (1993) [hereinafter Edelman et al., Internal
Dispute Resolution].
19. See STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5.
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though it is not overly focused on the anti-solidarity aspect of
Title VII and not concerned at all with the implications of
harassment law, Stein’s study, which is relentlessly nuanced
and ultimately quite persuasive, is, in many ways, the very
model of a class critique of Title VII.20
Building on these critiques, this Article exposes Title VII
as a law not simply flawed at its conception, but saddled with
a hostility to the realities of class conflict in the workplace,
and an indifference (if not hostility) to the collective interests
of workers. These antipathies have only worsened in the
decades since. Although not preoccupied with the
longstanding debate about the relative virtues of
employment law versus labor law, or the underlying
contention that the proliferation of employment laws has
diminished workers’ need for labor rights and the collective
representation that the labor law support, this Article does
offer an important rejoinder to that contention; for this
Article suggests that, in fact, what Title VII has actually done
is erode the foundations of workplace solidarity on which a
functional system of unionism and labor rights depends.
This argument unfolds as follows: Part I explores the
deeper roots of workplace paternalism and its contest with
worker solidarity. Drawing on Edwards’ critical narrative of
the struggle for control, it plumbs a more extensive literature
in labor history—anchored in the work of David Montgomery,
David Brody, and Lizabeth Cohen, among others—which
emphasizes how central a struggle pitting solidarity against
workplace paternalism was in the evolution of the labor
movement and the campaign for workers’ rights. Part II is a
critical review of the early history of Title VII, which draws
on the scholarship of Stein and her explorations to show how
class politics, centered on competing visions of solidarity and
employer control, attended the statute’s enactment. Part III
turns to Title VII itself; it details exactly how Title VII
elevates paternalism to the detriment of solidarity. This Part
builds its critique of the statute on a review of case law and
administrative policies as well as management practices that
the law has cultivated among employers. Finally, the
Conclusion considers this Article’s broader implications,
including the implication that in the dysfunctions of Title VII
20. See id.
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can be found, not only an important instance in the
antagonism between employment rights and labor rights, but
something fundamental about liberalism’s disqualifying
antipathy to the realities of class.
I. “CONTESTED TERRAIN”—THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF
THE WORKPLACE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA
Although it is a fundamental feature of labor and life in
modern society, the concept of worker solidarity can be tricky
to define. Dominant trends in scholarship suggest defining
the concept in quantitative, “behavioral” terms, and
measuring it, for example, by surveying workers’ attitudes.
But construing worker solidarity in this way is actually quite
problematic. Doing so simultaneously diminishes the
interplay of workers’ attitudes with their actions in
constituting solidarity, and discounts solidarity’s basis in the
realities of conflict and opposition in the workplace. From a
behavioral perspective, worker solidarity appears as a range
of static attitudes or dispositions, rather than as a human
institution that is shaped in the course of struggle, and whose
meaning is fully revealed only in this light.21 In other words,
worker solidarity can be seen and measured most clearly in
contests between workers and employers for control of the
workplace.22
Although nascent from the very first iterations of
industrialization, struggles between workers and capitalists
intensified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. At that time, automation and mechanization,
combined with immense accumulation of private capital,
mass immigration, and evolving ideologies of capitalist
entitlement and proletarian prerogative unsettled the
structure of work, intensified conflicts, rendered older forms
of workplace control obsolescent, and forced employers and
workers alike to reconfigure their strategies.23 After decades
21. See RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION, AND
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN WORKERS 4-8, 19-22 (1988).
22. Id. at 25-72.
23. On the overall history of labor relations in this period, see, for example,
PHILIP DRAY, THERE IS POWER IN A UNION: THE EPIC STORY OF LABOR IN AMERICA
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of discord punctuated by explosive conflict, in the 1930s and
1940s workers were able to make deep inroads against
employer sovereignty. The key institution in this
development was unionism, which assumed for the first time
an enduring and functional presence in American life.
Unionism at once embodied and incubated a vibrant culture
of workplace solidarity at the same time that unionism and
the solidarity on which unions were based were fomented by
the obsolescence of existing models of employer control. Via
collective bargaining agreements and shop floor
representation, both backed by the power of strikes,
unionism significantly qualified employers’ capacity for
control while expanding workers’ participation in
management.24 The question of control was hardly settled,
however. Workers’ successes on these fronts proved
contingent, as employers developed new methods of control,
which would soon inform the meaning of Title VII.25
A. The Evolving Landscape of Struggle
All work is conducive to conflict; but capitalism
engenders an inexorable struggle for control in the
workplace, as the profit motive drives employers to wrest as
much value out of the labor (or “labor power”) of their workers
as is practical; and as workers in turn resist these efforts in
pursuit of their own interests in ease, creativity, autonomy,
and material compensation.26 As Richard Edwards makes
clear, the modern history of capitalism can be understood as
a struggle between employers and workers over this question
of control, one defined by changing ideologies and methods of
control and resistance, and shaped by an evolving array of
economic and social structures. Edwards’ special gift rests in
the theoretical coherence his work gives to insights about the
(2010). On the building struggle for control, see, for example, DAVID MONTGOMERY,
THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN
LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 (1987); see also EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 11-36.
24. See infra Part I.E.
25. See infra Part I.E.
26. See EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 11-12; see also HARRY BRAVERMAN, LABOR
MONOPOLY CAPITAL: THE DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
57-69 (1974).
AND
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workplace that have been the province of social historians,
labor relations experts, and radical critics.27
In the early period of industrialization in this country,
the struggle for control was muted by the relatively small size
of capitalist concerns and the relative intimacy of
relationships between managers (who were often owners of
their businesses) and workers. These factors both diminished
conflict and facilitated its resolution. In Edwards’ terms,
“simple” forms of managerial control sufficed: “although the
need for control was great, the mechanisms for achieving it
were very unsophisticated, and the systems of control tended
to be informal and unstructured.”28 Often enough “the
personal power and authority of the capitalist” himself (of
course they were virtually all men) were adequate to ensure
effective rule of the workplace.29 Workers might very well feel
“oppressed and exploited by such employers, but they also
became enmeshed in a whole network of personal relations”
that diminished worker solidarity and militancy at the same
time that it legitimated employers’ authority.30
As it unfolded, industrialization steadily uprooted these
conditions, particularly in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. For industrialization unsettled work; it
eroded older, traditional pillars of authority that had
prevailed in the workshops and small mills and factories.
Smaller work units, often built around intimate community
and family ties, were increasingly eviscerated as production
was relocated to larger factories and anonymous contractual
relations came to tie workers more loosely to their employers.
In this period, employers and workers were further divided
as the ethnic and racial homogeneity of enterprises was
diminished by the influx of millions of immigrants and
internal migrants of diverse backgrounds. In this way,
anonymity and alienation replaced familiarity and intimacy.
The result, according to Edwards, was the increasing

27. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 11-19.
28. See id. at 18-19.
29. Id. at 25.
30. Id. at 26.
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obsolescence of simple control culminating in a “crisis of
control.”31
On the shop floors, employers met this crisis by replacing
simple systems of control with what Edwards calls
“hierarchical control,” characterized by highly structured,
often explicitly militaristic, systems of domination in which
employers’ prerogatives were mediated by the naked
authority of foremen and supervisors.32 As a number of
researchers have noted, a veritable “foreman’s empire” was
erected on the industrial landscape, as these intermediaries
wielded the authority, largely unchecked by anyone, to hire,
fire, promote, demote, dock, discipline, or otherwise
drastically alter the terms of service of the men and women
who labored under them.33 In many workplaces, this system
of governance was quite brutal. A telling example can be
found at Ford Motor, which through the 1930s maintained a
“service department” of some “3,500 thugs, including former
boxers, ex-cops, bouncers, football players and ex-FBI
agents” who backed up the company’s foremen, dispensing
threats and beatings to workers in its plants.34
These methods of control reflected intensified conflict
between employers and workers. The cold logic of
exploitation joined with immigration and the rapidly growing
size of firms in corroding intimacies between employers and
workers and sweeping aside traditional norms of workplace
fairness.35 From every corner of the working class, currents
of militancy emerged in the form of left-wing political
movements and various versions of unionism, united by little
more than a common “resistance to their capitalist
overlords.”36 As labor historian David Montgomery notes, on
at least three major occasions between the late nineteenth
31. Id. at 33-34, 52-71.
32. Id. at 25-34.
33. See, e.g., DAVID NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS
FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, 34-54 (1975).

OF THE

NEW

34. See Robert P. Weiss, Private Detective Agencies and Labour Discipline in
the United States, 1855–1946, 29 HIST. J. 87, 105 (1986).
35. See EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 18-19, 25-26, 51.
36. See id. at 48.
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century and the Second World War, this militant resistance
coalesced in concentrated periods of widespread struggle:
1901–1904, 1916–1920, and 1934–1941.37 However the first
two of these campaigns foundered primarily because
employers were increasingly successful not only in changing
the terms of exploitation, but in rooting out organized
resistance on the part of workers. In this, the instruments of
hierarchical control were themselves quite useful, not least
in mobilizing naked authority, including private police and
armies of strikebreakers, to crush strikes.38
In these efforts, employers were also abetted by the fact
that, until the mid-1930s, craft unionism, embodied in the
ideals and practices of the leading labor federation, the
American Federation of Labor (AFL), reigned as the leading
form of unionism. In line with this orientation, the AFL and
its constituent unions featured a parochial orientation that
was at once increasingly dysfunctional in the face of
deskilling and automation, and unsuited by structure and
political temperament to accommodate into their ranks a
rapidly diversifying working class.39 Unions in this fold stood
little chance in contesting the prerogatives of employers that
wielded ever-more economic power and influence over courts
and police; and they were repeatedly swept aside in labor
conflicts during these periods.40
Importantly, unionization and union activism were not
the only modes of resistance to employer control. Aside from
formal political activism, which then as now is the nearexclusive province of elites, there was also so-called shop floor
resistance on the part of workers: largely informal, often
spontaneous acts of defiance, including walkouts and
“quickie strikes”; verbal challenges and threats of physical
37. David Montgomery, The ‘New Unionism’ and the Transformation of
Workers’ Consciousness in America, 1909–1922, 4 J. SOC. HIST. 509, 515 (1974).
38. DRAY, supra note 23, at 334-44, 368-69, 382-90; EDWARDS, supra note 4, at
59-63.
39. These processes are richly described by David Montgomery and David
Brody. See generally DAVID BRODY, STEELWORKERS IN AMERICA: THE NONUNION
ERA (1960); MONTGOMERY, supra note 23.
40. For a review of events through this period of labor history, see DRAY, supra
note 23, at 107-21, 243-51.
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violence, often directed at foremen; thefts of property or time;
and sabotage of equipment.41 Far more pervasive than
strikes, such forms of resistance were an absolute affront to
hierarchical control. They could also be as damaging to
employers’ interests as organized protests—not least because
the spontaneity of such tactics (and their secrecy) made them
hard to defeat; and they could just as easily emerge in the
absence of union organization.42
In order to combat such tactics, in the first decades of the
twentieth century, hierarchical control was increasingly
augmented by what Edwards calls “technical control.”43 With
technical control, direction and disciplinary functions are
embedded in the nature of the task itself, usually via the
structure of production. In the words of Harry Braverman,
the one-time factory worker, whose critique of the
degradation of work remains a classic: “[m]achinery offers to
management the opportunity to do by wholly mechanical
means that which it had previously attempted to do by
organizational and disciplinary means.”44 The archetype of
technical control is the assembly line or, more broadly, the
concept of “continuous flow” production, in which individual
workers are all captive to specific tasks and a pace of work
over which they have very limited control. “With the line,”
writes Edwards, “the worker-boss struggle was mediated by
technology, and the bosses were no longer responsible for
actively directing workers in the sequence or the pace of their
tasks.”45 Under this regime, “the human hierarchy and the
capitalist organization of production that has produced the
technology appear to recede.”46

41. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 53-54; Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Industrial
Recreation, the Second World War, and the Revival of Welfare Capitalism, 19341960, 60 BUS. HIST. REV. 232, 233 (1986) [hereinafter Fones-Wolf, Industrial
Recreation].
42. See Fones-Wolf, Industrial Recreation, supra note 41.
43. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 20.
44. BRAVERMAN, supra note 26, at 195-97.
45. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 121.
46. Id. at 125.
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Although a familiar concept to the most casual students
of workplace control, “Taylorism” or “scientific management”
was in many ways less an operative system of management
in its own right—its extreme mandates often foundered in
the face of workers’ shop floor resistance—than an
intellectual program which combined elements of
hierarchical and technical control. In Braverman’s apt
depiction, “[s]cientific management,” is little more than “an
attempt to apply the methods of science to the increasingly
complex problems of the control of labor . . . .”47 Its key theme,
and its most enduring feature, is the idea that management
should wrest from workers “control over the special
knowledge of production.”48 While “time-motion” studies of
the proper use of a shovel and other practical iterations of
scientific management have become the stuff of classroom
humor, the essential logic of scientific management can still
be found in the workplace, in the way employers have
operationalized the anti-harassment norms of Title VII.
In their attempts to contest the new systems of employer
control, workers also had to contend with initiatives by which
employers presented themselves as paternalistic guardians
of workers’ interests. In some respects, these efforts took the
form of practical institutions of so-called “welfare
capitalism,” including employer-subsidized home purchasing
programs and stock options, which were designed to increase
workers’ dependence on employers and increase the costs of
strikes or firings motivated by disloyalty.49 Such programs
proliferated in the early twentieth century. The same Ford
Motor that deployed thousands of thuggish servicemen to
menace and brutalize its workers maintained a vibrant array
of paternalistic programs.50 But in a way that speaks volumes
47. BRAVERMAN, supra note 26, at 86.
48. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 104.
49. LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO,
1919–1939, at 163-76, 183-84 (2d ed. 2008).
50. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKERS 1933–1941, at 570-71, 734-35 (1969) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, THE
TURBULENT YEARS]; EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 117-18; Robert P. Weiss, Private
Detective Agencies and Labour Discipline in the United States, 1855–1946, 29
HIST. J. 87, 105 (1986).
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about the true nature of welfare capitalism, these
arrangements, including Ford’s supposedly beneficent $5 per
day wage plan (still invoked today as an example of socially
responsible capitalism), concealed a ruthless scheme for
cultivating dependency and coercing obedience to
management.51
In other cases, paternalism was institutionalized in
employee representation plans, or ERPs, which were
essentially company unions designed to preempt
independent union representation.52 Touted by liberal
reformers and corporate ideologists alike, ERPs proliferated
gradually from the mid-1910s through the 1920s, before
exploding in frequency in the early 1930s, when employers
embraced them as means of forestalling escalating union
organizing efforts and pretending compliance with early
(poorly drafted) New Deal legislation that seemed to favor
union representation and collective bargaining. Although
sometimes useful in representing workers’ interests, the
ERPs uniformly were “constructed to keep managerial
control intact.”53 Worse than their immediate functions was
their ideological program, as their structures were designed
to “replace working-class solidarity with company solidarity,
shop solidarity, or ‘family factory relations.’”54
The ideology of paternalism was also reflected in a wideranging propaganda program, financed by powerful trade
associations, which identified employers’ interests with those
of their workers, while tarring unionists as corrupt, selfish
outsiders, willing to sacrifice (other) workers’ interests to
dishonest economic motives and radical political aims.
Although often deployed locally and in fairly informal ways,
this propaganda program became increasingly sophisticated
and coordinated across entire industries through the first
51. See BRAVERMAN, supra note 26, at 149-50; FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 2829.
52. See COHEN, supra note 49, at 163-83; HORACE B. DAVIS, LABOR AND STEEL
148-51 (1933); see also Daniel Nelson, The Company Union Movement,
1900–1937: A Reexamination, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 335, 336 (1982).
53. FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 37
54. Id. at 32, 35-37.
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three decades of the twentieth century.55 Its central motif was
the “open shop” concept,56 which deceptively packaged
employers’ categorical opposition to genuine union
representation as a benign nod to the liberty interests of their
workers.
Welfare capitalism reached its zenith in the 1920s, when
it constituted the main pillar in a comprehensive system of
employer domination variously propagandized as the
“American Plan,” the “New Era,”57 and the reign of the “right
to work.”58 Augmenting the more practical aspects of welfare
capitalism with cultural and recreational programs, and
activities like company-sponsored picnics that we would now
call (with appropriate derision) exercises in “team building,”
companies managed to install a “company family concept”
that blunted both the profound alienation that the modern
workplace generated among those who labored in it, as well
as workers’ efforts to unionize.59 Welfare capitalism gave a
paternalistic veneer to hierarchical control. However, it
remained fundamentally consistent with such control, not
least in that its many iterations were never anything but
employer prerogatives designed, at root, to foster dependency
on the part of workers while advancing a positive image of
the companies that practiced them.60
A crucial turning point in the struggle for control of the
workplace arrived in the 1930s. The most visible
preconditions of this change occurred in the domains of
politics, economics, and law. Of course, this was the period of
the Great Depression and the New Deal. While the latter
created a level of desperation that generated militancy by its
55. See, e.g., Richard S. Tedlow, The National Association of Manufacturers
and Public Relations during the New Deal, 50 BUS. HIST. REV. 25, 27-34 (1976).
56. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER,
1920–1933, at 147-48 (1960) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS].
57. BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS, supra note 56 at 148; Nelson, supra note 52,
at 336.
58. FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 39-44.
59. Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, Industrial Unionism and Labor Union Culture in
Depression-Era Philadelphia, 109 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3, 6 (1985)
[hereinafter Fones-Wolf, Industrial Unionism].
60. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 94-95.
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own hand, the New Deal inaugurated a new political
economy and legal order which entertained the possibility, at
least, of government-sanctioned interventions into the
domain of employer control.61 Thus, section 7(a) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 purported to protect
the right of workers to form unions and engage in collective
bargaining; and the National Labor Relations (or Wagner)
Act of 1935 encoded these rights (and the right to strike) in a
comprehensive administrative program.62
At the end of the day, laws are neither self-enforcing nor
self-validating—a
point
well
illustrated
by
the
administrative failure of section 7(a), followed by the
invalidation of a majority of the National Industrial Recovery
Act.63 Both developments were the product of intense
opposition from the business community.64 Rather, the
realization of effective constraints on employer control
depended on an uprising by workers that began in the early
1930s and culminated in huge organizing gains later in the
decade. Although a rank-and-file affair at root, this
movement was much aided by Communists, social
democrats, and other leftists, who together managed to forge
what historian Lizabeth Cohen calls a “culture of unity”65
among the diverse and hitherto fractious ethnic and racial
divisions of the industrial working class.66 For Cohen, the
61. On the New Deal’s overall approach to labor rights, see ELLIS HAWLEY, THE
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE
12, 195-97 (1995).
62. See id.
63. On the dysfunctions of section 7(a) and its invalidation by the Supreme
Court, see BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 172-85, 342-43.
64. The relevant portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act, Title II, was
struck down by the Supreme Court in May of 1935. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). However, the labor provision had
proved ineffective in the face of employer resistance long before this occurred. On
the story of this failure, see JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD (1974).
65. See COHEN, supra note 49, at 324.
66. See BERT COCHRAN, LABOR AND COMMUNISM: THE CONFLICT THAT SHAPED
AMERICAN UNIONS 43-103 (1977). On the important role of leftists during this
period of labor history, see JUDITH STEPAN-NORRIS & MAURICE ZEITLIN, LEFT OUT:
REDS AND AMERICA’S INDUSTRIAL UNIONS (2002). The best overview of the labor
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cornerstone of this effort was the success of labor
organizations (many of them mere plant committees and
other nascent, vulnerable formations), particularly those
under the umbrella of the Committee for Industrial
Organization (CIO, later the Congress of Industrial
Organizations), in subverting divisions among workers on
the basis of ethnicity and skill, and challenging the
implements of employer paternalism. They accomplished this
by courting local ethnic institutions, particularly churches
and fraternal organizations; by infiltrating the ERPs, which
they turned to their own purposes; and by destabilizing the
very concept of employer paternalism, which the ERPs
embodied, using their empty promises of genuine worker
representation to steer workers towards more meaningful
and effective organizations.67 Built on such efforts, CIO
unions were also able to make important inroads against the
image of unions, so thoroughly embodied in the AFL old craft
organizations, as exclusionary, racist and xenophobic,
organizationally moribund, and enslaved to the interests of
their own members (if not strictly their own bureaucratic
leaderships); they were able to cultivate instead a very
different image of unions as inclusive, activist, and above all
committed to the vision of worker solidarity that helped give
rise to them in the first place.68
Another crucial factor in the success of unions in this
period concerned the nature of both hierarchical and
technical control, whose contradictions influenced their own
demise. As Edwards points out, both methods suffered from
debilitating transparency in the way they exploited workers.
“As a naked and clearly visible system of power, hierarchical
movement during this period remains in two volumes by Irving Bernstein.
See generally BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS, supra note 56; BERNSTEIN, THE
TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50; see also RHONDA F. LEVINE, CLASS STRUGGLE
AND THE NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL LABOR, INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL, AND THE STATE
passim (1988).
67. COHEN, supra note 49, at 171-73, 291-321.
68. On this process, in which black workers themselves actively participated,
see, for example, RUTH NEEDLEMAN, BLACK FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN STEEL: THE
STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRATIC UNIONISM (2003); BRUCE NELSON, WORKERS ON THE
WATERFRONT: SEAMEN, LONGSHOREMEN, AND UNIONISM IN THE 1930S, at 84-85,
133-34 (1988) [hereinafter NELSON, WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT].

1080

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

control revealed to the workers the oppressive nature of
capitalist relations.”69 Although effective in many respects,
the “close supervision” inherent in hierarchical control
generated “intensified militance among the oppressed.”70
Workers chaffed at the oppressions of technical control too,
as they were able to perceive in the speed of the line or the
rigors of the task, the human hand of exploitation. Unions
appeared increasingly attractive in this light.
The history of New Deal labor relations is very much
defined by employers’ entrenched and often violent defense
of their incumbent prerogatives and their resistance to the
currents of reform. The resulting battles between employers
and workers unfolded on a scale and with a ferocity
unsurpassed in American history. Powerful employers,
deeply committed to their own vision of the workplace and
contemptuous of legal obligations under the labor law,
bitterly contested workers’ efforts to challenge their rule.71
How these struggles played out around competing visions of
employer sovereignty and worker solidarity is nowhere better
illustrated than in two signal clashes that should be familiar
to all students of this period: the struggle of autoworkers at
General Motors in 1936 and 1937 to establish effective union
representation at that company; and the campaign to
organize steel workers in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, which
unfolded over that same time-frame and gave rise to the
Supreme Court’s landmark decision NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel.72 The story of these struggles, briefly told,
illustrates how the contest for control of the workplace not
only shaped the course of these disputes and others like
them, but also framed workplace law and policy in the
decades that followed.

69. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 53.
70. Id.
71. For a review of this struggle, see Ahmed A. White, Industrial Terrorism
and the Unmaking of New Deal Labor Law, 11 NEV. L.J. 561, 573-606 (2010)
[hereinafter White, Industrial Terrorism].
72. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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B. The General Motors Sit-Down Strikes
The GM sit down strikes, centered at Flint, Michigan,
constitute one of the most important events in American
history. The key facts are fairly well-known and may be
stated succinctly: on the last day of the year, 1936, hundreds
of workers at GM’s sprawling production complex in Flint,
Michigan, seized two factories and then held them for six
weeks, defying injunctions and defeating a full-scale effort by
local police to drive them out. Eventually, the conflict, which
was front-page news throughout the country, spread to other
GM plants and crippled the company’s operations. Unable to
convince state officials to use overwhelming force to drive out
the Flint sit-down strikers, company officials retreated from
a long-held, categorical opposition to treating with
independent unions and agreed to negotiate with
representatives of the strikers’ union, the United Automobile
Workers, or UAW.73
GM’s opposition to independent unionism had been
backed by a vast infrastructure of labor repression, which
featured both soft and hard forms of hierarchical control and
accomplished far more than simply warding off formal union
representation. The company maintained a host of welfarist
programs for its workers, including bonus and savings plans,
an insurance program, stock ownership plans, a housing
program, and an array of recreational and cultural
programs.74 However, it also maintained what government
investigators called an “amazing and terrifying”75 system of
espionage at its plants, operated by about 200 companyemployed spies, as well as agents provided by a dozen
detective agencies and an unknown number of GM employees
who had been coerced into spying on their fellow workers.
The company also maintained one of the largest police forces
in the country; it employed more than 1400 well-armed
73. On the strike and the events surrounding it, see generally SIDNEY FINE,
SIT-DOWN: THE GENERAL MOTORS STRIKE OF 1936–1937 (1969).
74. See id. at 22-26.
75. Ahmed A. White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes and the Limits of
Liberal Labor Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 11 (2010) [hereinafter White, The
Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes].
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company police.76 These spies and police concerned
themselves with every aspect of life in and around GM’s
plants; and they gave backing to the front-line authority of
GM’s foremen, who ruled the shop floors.
Workers’ anger and frustration with these oppressive
dimensions of hierarchical control were major influences
behind the move to organize GM that eventually culminated
in the strikes, which originated among the rank-and-file. As
Sidney Fine’s definitive history of the strikes confirms, the
main grievance among GM’s workers was not pay, but rather
with the company’s system of control. Workers were keenly
disappointed with GM’s welfare program, whose caprices
were laid bare by Depression Era conditions.77 And they also
deeply resented the rampant oppression they endured on the
shop floors, including arbitrary rules for determining tenure
and time of employment, and inscrutable pay systems.78
Although Fine is right in pointing out that the grievances
regarding the rigors of assembly line work probably captured
too much attention among observers–fewer than one-fifth
actually performed such work—the workers in this uprising
against GM were definitely motivated as well by resistance
to the company’s assertion of technical controls. In
particular, workers chaffed at the company’s relentless
employment of the “speed up,” which in an integrated factory,
reached beyond the assembly line to intensify the
exploitation of all of its production workers.79
In its reliance on these methods, GM was fairly typical of
major employers in this period. But the sit-down strikers’
defeat of the company was quite remarkable. Their victory
established the UAW, which was affiliated with the CIO, at
what was then the largest company in the world. In forcing
GM to deal with the UAW, the strikes removed it from its
position as the cornerstone of a program of concerted
opposition to the New Deal on the part of powerful industrial
capitalists. In the meantime, the sit-down strikes electrified
76. Id.
77. FINE, supra note 73, at 26-27.
78. Id. at 59-61.
79. Id. at 54-59.
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other workers, inspiring an enormous wave of labor
militancy, highlighted by hundreds of other sit-down strikes
that swept over the country through the first half of 1937.80
Perhaps even more important, the strikes helped secure the
constitutionality of the Wagner Act, and indeed helped
secure the political and legal survival of the entire New
Deal.81
The GM sit-down strikes also illustrate the crucial role
that solidarity played in forming the foundation of militant
resistance to employer control. As James Pope makes clear,
the strikes in Flint were the culmination of a vibrant
movement among industrial workers in the 1930s, with deep
roots in the automobile and rubber industries, in which these
workers increasingly asserted their prerogatives, not only to
receive better wages, but to regain some control over the very
processes of production.82 Long before some of them contrived
to occupy GM’s plants, workers were already seizing back
from employers’ some influence how those plants should be
run and by whom.83 What happened at GM was actually a
major cresting in this wave of grass-roots and shop floor
militancy whose strength is underscored by the success the
workers had in holding the plants in good order for so long.84
At GM and elsewhere, such assertions of solidarity and
demands for worker control were directly at the expense of
employers’ own claims to control the workplace via rules,
policies, and personnel of their choosing and were a vivid
example of how incumbent forms of control contributed to
their own demise. At the same time, their success positioned
workers, via union representation, to reshape the workplace
in partial compliance with their own interests and values.
Another important expression of this clash over contested
visions of the workplace can be found in events that came to
80. See White, The Depression Era Sit-Down Strikes, supra note 75, at 10-11,
15-16.
81. See Jim Pope, Worker Lawmaking, Sit-Down Strikes, and the Shaping of
American Industrial Relations, 1935–1958, 24 LAW & HIST. REV. 45, 91, 95-96
(2006).
82. See id. at 50-60.
83. See id. at 49-50.
84. See id. at 56-61.
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a head only a couple of months after the GM sit-downs
strikes, in Aliquippa.
C. The Steel Workers’ Struggle at Aliquippa
As both David Brody and David Montgomery have
shown, the steel industry had long been the scene of
especially heated conflict over control, not least because it
was also home to a particularly rapid and complete triumph
of modern, industrial capitalist production over more
traditional organizations and practices. By the mid-1930s,
the industry, which was already highly mechanized, was not
overly invested in technical forms of control;85 but it was
committed to a system of hierarchical control based in an
array of welfarist programs, ERPs, and a capacity for raw
repression that exceeded even that of GM. Although brutal
methods often prevailed—a truth reflected in the bloody
battles at Homestead, Pennsylvania, in 1982, and during the
Great Steel Strike of 1919—the industry offers a striking
example of how the apparent conflict between these
seemingly very different ways of controlling workers was
muted, rhetorically at least, by strident appeals to
paternalism.
By the mid- to late-1930s, the steel industry and its allies
expended enormous sums courting workers with the idea
that the companies cared deeply for them, and that the main
threat to workers’ interests lay not with the companies’
relentless drive to exploit them and assert control over them,
but with the irresponsible intrigues of other workers, often
instigated by radical agitators and other outsiders, who
wanted nothing more than to foment ruinous strikes and to
poison the workplace with an air of antipathy between
workers and capitalists.86 In this way, steel workers were
85. The industry’s use of technical controls was limited by the process of
making steel itself, which could not easily be rushed, and probably also by the low
ratio of labor costs to capital investment. See EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 115.
86. S. REP. NO. 77-151, pt. 1, at 91-93, 109-13, 300-14, 320-21 (1939); Frank H.
Blumenthal, Anti-Union Publicity in the Johnstown “Little Steel” Strike of 1937,
3 PUB. OPINION Q. 676, 677 (1939). On the full range of material developed for the
campaign, see Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Part 18–Employer
Associations and “Citizens’ Committees”: Hearing on S. Res. 266 Before a
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invited to think of the companies’ massive arsenals of
firearms and gas weapons, and their cadres of heavily armed
company police, not as outrageous affronts to the companies’
paternalistic pretensions, but as essential extensions of this
platform.87
All of the major steel companies (and many companies in
other industries) subscribed to this program; and in the case
of company propaganda, they actually coordinated in
producing it. However, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation
was particularly well-endowed in its capacity for hierarchical
control, it seemed, not least because of the peculiar situation
at its plant in Aliquippa, one of its two major operations. At
a time when company towns were still commonplace,
Aliquippa was perhaps the quintessential company town.
Most of Aliquippa’s working population was employed by the
company and the company exercised more or less direct
control of crucial civic functions: the police, retail commerce,
the housing market, many social clubs, the political process,
and so forth.88 The director of Jones & Laughlin’s operations
in Aliquippa in the 1910s and 1920s described the company’s
rule as a “benevolent dictatorship.”89 And on the shop floors,
the “foreman’s empire” remained fully intact.90
And so it was that for years, workers who sought to
organize independent unions in the town were hunted down
and ejected, often after being severely beaten by company
police. In one notorious episode in 1926, several union
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 75th Cong. 7766-78, 7895-908, 791023, 8031-50, 8069-85 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings] (citing exhibits 3853, 3858-59,
3873, 3885); id. at Part 35, 14386-479 (1939). This position was clearly articulated
in a series of articles and statements in the industry’s trade journal. See L.W.
Moffett, Washington, IRON AGE, July 9, 1936, at 72, 75-76; Royalist Lewis Adds
Fabricators to His Prospective Empire, IRON AGE, July 30, 1936, at 45; Steel
Companies Meet Unionization Drive With Statement of Position, IRON AGE, July
9, 1936, at 88; Steel Industry States Attitude Toward Unionization Drive Now
Under Way, IRON AGE, July 2, 1936, at 55.
87. See S. REP. NO. 76-6, pt. 3 at 5-13 (1939).
88. See Kenneth Casebeer, Aliquippa: The Company Town and Contested
Power in the Construction of Law, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 617, 627-33 (1995).
89. See TOM GIRDLER WITH BOYDEN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF TOM GIRDLER 177 (1943).
90. See EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 115.
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sympathizers who dared meet together were “convicted” in
an ad hoc tribunal and sentenced to five years in the county
workhouse.91 Perhaps as important in securing the company’s
control, all workers in the town were subject to being spied
on, having their political votes dictated by company agents,
and of course being invited to bear witness to what happened
to those who overtly supported unionism—while being
reminded of how much the company cared about them and
how vigilant it was in protecting their interests.92 In 1934, the
wife of Pennsylvania’s governor was able to address a union
meeting in Aliquippa only with state police protection, and
with company machine guns trained on the crowd.93
Nevertheless, Jones & Laughlin was not immune to the
larger forces that were cultivating worker solidarity and
militancy, and undermining the company’s system of
control.94 Matters in Aliquippa came to a head beginning in
1936, when the CIO’s Steel Workers Organizing Committee
(SWOC) brought the company into its campaign to organize
steel. As at Flint, workers in Aliquippa were eventually able
to overthrow the company’s archaic system of labor control,
but not without great difficulty. From the beginning of its
drive, SWOC organizers working in Aliquippa faced intense
repression.95 The organizers’ rooms and persons were
searched without warrant, and their union materials were
confiscated and destroyed.96 They were arrested “by the
dozen” and charged with disorderly conduct, with the fines to
be deducted directly from their pay, if they worked for the

91. See Casebeer, supra note 88, at 634-35.
92. See id. at 627-54.
93. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 1 N.L.R.B. 503, 510 (1936); JOHN BODNAR,
WORKERS’ WORLD: KINSHIP, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST IN AN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY,
1900–1940, at 125-34 (1982).
94. See BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 475-77.
95. Id.
96. ROBERT R.R. BROOKS, AS STEEL GOES . . . UNIONISM IN A BASIC INDUSTRY 118
(1940).
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company.97 Those who worked in the mills were also often
threatened, demoted, or discharged.98
As at GM, workers’ efforts to overthrow this system of
control were both an immediate prerequisite of union
representation and its raison d’etre. The culmination of their
efforts was a massive strike. Beginning on May 12, 1937,
virtually the whole town turned out on the picket line. Huge
numbers of picketers besieged the company’s sprawling
plant, taking advantage of the mill’s geography to place a
cordon sanitaire around it. Armed with bats, clubs, and pipes,
they routed the company police. Jones & Laughlin was forced
to close the Aliquippa mill.99 Fearing the effect of an extended
shutdown on its viability and bowing to the fact that it could
not foresee ousting the picketers any time soon, after three
days the company capitulated. It agreed to do something that
seemed quite unthinkable only weeks earlier: to grant the
SWOC exclusive representation if it won a National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB)-sponsored election. Little over a
week later, on May 25, the union won the election by a
decisive margin and the CIO had its first exclusive contract
with a major steel producer.100 The victory catalyzed a string
of organizing successes at dozens, and then hundreds, of
other, mainly smaller steel companies and set the union on
its way to organizing nearly the entire steel industry.101 The
97. Id.
98. See Jones & Laughlin Steel, 1 N.L.R.B. at 503, 512, 516; BROOKS, supra
note 96, at 117-20.
99. See BROOKS, supra note 96, at 123-27; C.I.O. Steel Strike Shuts Two Plants
of Jones-Laughlin: 27,000 Men Idled, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1937, at 1; see also
BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 477-78; ROBERT H. ZIEGER,
AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920–1985, at 50, 60-61 (1986); Louis
Stark, Peace Plan Drawn in Big Steel Strike; More Plants Close, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 1937, at 1; C.I.O. Spreads Steel Strike: Seeks to Stir 200,000 Men to Join
Walkout, CHI. TRIB., May 14, 1937, at 1.
100. See BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 477-78; ZIEGER,
supra note 99, at 50, 60-61; CIO Victorious in Sharon Vote, CANTON REPOSITORY,
May 26, 1937, at 1; SWOC Wins by 10,000 at J-L; Sharon Steel Vote May 25, STEEL
LAB., May 24, 1937, at 1. Frank Purnell of Sheet & Tube also testified that Jones
& Laughlin was motivated by economic vulnerability to sign. See Hearings, supra
note 86, at Part 27, 11241-42 (1939).
101. See The Union Mills, STEEL LAB., June 5, 1937, at 2; The Union Mills, STEEL
LAB., May 15, 1937, at 2; Wheeling Steel, Timken Roller, 86 Others Sign, STEEL
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events at Aliquippa—the organizing that preceded the
strike—also led directly to the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision to uphold the Wagner Act in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin, decided as the union’s drive gained steam and only
about six weeks prior to the decisive strike.102
As at Flint, the underpinning of these developments was
the union’s success in completely subverting employer
paternalism at Aliquippa with a carefully crafted program of
worker solidarity, cloaked at first in secrecy but increasingly
rooted in the union’s penetration of churches, fraternal
organizations, and other community groups, and its stealthy
infiltration of the shop floor.103 Indeed, as Kenneth Casebeer
emphasizes in his study of this struggle, SWOC organizers
made ironic use of the very dynamic that seemed to
guarantee company control at Aliquippa—the fact that it was
pervaded by intimacies, ironically preserved from the
effacing powers of industrial capitalism by the company town
itself—in redirecting worker loyalties from the company to
the union.104
D. The Changing Dynamics of Control and the Birth of the
Modern Labor Movement
More than simply illustrating the power of worker
solidarity in overcoming employer intransigence, the
SWOC’s victory at Aliquippa and the UAW’s defeat of GM
stand out as key chapters in a complex and often dramatic
campaign on the part of a resurgent labor movement, led by
the CIO, to organize American workers, normalize collective
bargaining, and refashion the workplace. There were other
vivid contests during this period at other automobile and
steel companies, and in rubber, electrical equipment, glass,
textiles, and ocean shipping, to name a few of the industries

LAB., May 1, 1937, at 1; 23 More Corporations Sign with Steel Union, STEEL LAB.,
Mar. 20, 1937, at 1; 51 Steel Mills Signed as Lodges Climb to 492, STEEL LAB.,
Apr. 10, 1937, at 1.
102. See NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
103. See Casebeer, supra note 88, at 626, 673.
104. Id.
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affected.105 In virtually all of these struggles, the basic
structure of conflict evident in Flint and Aliquippa in early
1937 repeated itself as workers mobilized to displace
oppressive systems of control.106 Although political and legal
dynamics, including the enactment of the National Labor
Relations Act were important, solidarity was absolutely key.
In Rick Fantasia’s words, “It was not the law that proved
decisive in labor’s greatest victory to date, but a culture of
solidarity that could freely negotiate a set of tactics and
methods to meet the employers with their tactics and
methods head-on and carry the workers through.”107
This culture of solidarity was prefigured by the structure
of the workplace and the dynamics of control in place, but it
also grew out of intimate connections that were tirelessly
cultivated by workers and union organizers. Records from the
epic drive to organize steel that entailed the struggle at Jones
& Laughlin confirm this. In the mill towns, organizers
needed not only to pass out literature and make speeches, but
also to meet with workers one-on-one and in small groups
where they could prod and press the virtues of unionism,
assuage workers’ fears of the companies, and erode their
faith in company paternalism.108 As one participant recalled,
“The task was to establish a core of secret union members in
one department [in the plants] after another, without the
company’s knowledge.”109 This often required first
approaching workers in secret, sometimes at the workers’
homes, perhaps after dark to avoid arousing the suspicions of
neighbors. But this was no easy thing; “organizers worked
day and night for months.”110
105. For a review of the major episodes in this struggle, see BERNSTEIN, THE
TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 572-634.
106. Id.
107. FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 47.
108. See Hearings, supra note 86, at Part 44, 16631-34 (citing exhibits 7421-23);
COHEN, supra note 49, at 318-19; Interview by C. F. Traynor with John S. Johns,
(Mar. 3, 1978), at 8 (on file with author); Minutes from SWOC Fieldworkers
Meetings, Calumet District (1936–1942) (on file with author).
109. JOHN WILLIAMSON, DANGEROUS SCOT: THE LIFE AND WORK OF AN AMERICAN
“UNDESIRABLE” 126 (1969).
110. Id. at 125-26.
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This wave of solidarity immersed entire urban areas,
sweeping aside workers’ faith in welfare capitalism, the
“company family concept,” and other trappings of
paternalistic hierarchical control.111 In a vast display of the
dialectic of spontaneity, ideology, and structure that defines
the nature of solidarity, union activists nurtured this culture
of camaraderie and common purpose at the same time that
their very presence on the field of industrial conflict
depended on an upsurge of consciousness and militancy that
began among the workers themselves and could be traced to
the economic and political conditions of the Depression Era.112
These struggles were difficult. Employers retained great
power despite the Depression and the New Deal; and
resistance was not easily overcome. The UAW defeated
Chrysler with sit-down strikes in the spring of 1937 but
faltered at Ford, whose servicemen brutalized its
organizers.113 The SWOC’s drive prevailed against Jones &
Laughlin and led the powerful industry leader, U.S. Steel, to
acquiesce to union representation earlier in March; but it
culminated in a brutal and unsuccessful strike at the other
major steel companies in the summer of 1937. The “Little
Steel” Strike, in which at least sixteen unionists were killed,
hundreds injured, and maybe 2000 arrested, was a major
setback for the SWOC, the CIO, and unionism in general. The
strike was lost despite extraordinary displays of solidarity,
including mass strike participation across ethnic lines, citywide general strikes, and one particularly poignant episode
in which thousands of sympathetic miners marched through
one of the mill towns arm-in-arm in support of embattled
steel workers.114 The Little Steel affair is a study in the
resiliency of hierarchical control. Not until the eve of the
111. See Fones-Wolf, Industrial Unionism, supra note 59, at 6.
112. On this characterization of the nature of solidarity, see, for example, Marc
Dixon et al., Unions, Solidarity, and Striking, 83 SOC. FORCES 3, 6-7 (2004).
113. See BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 734-51; White,
Industrial Terrorism, supra note 71, at 585-88.
114. On the events of the strike, see AHMED WHITE, THE LAST GREAT STRIKE:
LITTLE STEEL, THE CIO, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR LABOR RIGHTS IN NEW DEAL
AMERICA (forthcoming 2016). On the miners’ display of solidarity, see JACK
METZGAR, STRIKING STEEL: SOLIDARITY REMEMBERED 4 (2000).
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Second World War increased the costs of continued labor
unrest did Ford and the Little Steel companies concede to
union representation.115
Despite resistance of this kind and weakening political
support in the late 1930s for the labor movement and the
New Deal, the union movement nevertheless achieved
tremendous growth. Total union membership just about
tripled between 1933 and 1941, reaching nearly 10 million
just prior to America’s entry into the Second World War. 116
Union density increased from 6.9% of the nonagricultural
workforce in 1933, to 27.9% in 1941.117 The war itself
expanded production in industries where unions had recently
established themselves and brought about government
production controls, which favored labor peace, leading to
further increases in membership. By 1945, something like
14.5 million men and women—35.4% of the nonagricultural
workforce—were union members.118 Employer sovereignty
yielded. Unionized workers were positioned for the first time
to play prominent roles in both formal politics and the
governance of the workplace.119 Through their unions,
workers forged collective bargaining agreements that
increased compensation and benefits and regulated hiring,
discipline,
promotion,
and
discharge
procedures.
Importantly, even many nonunionized employers embraced
these standards, either to avoid unionization or to forestall
labor conflict more generally.120
It must be emphasized that neither this organizational
triumph nor the remarkable upsurge in worker solidarity
that accompanied it abolished racism, sexism, and other
types of inequality in the workplace. Needless to say,
115. See BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 50, at 729-31, 747.
116. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32553, UNION MEMBERSHIP
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 22-23 tbl.A1 (2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See id.; NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF
AMERICAN LABOR 100-01 (2002) [hereinafter LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION];
ZIEGER, supra note 99, at 100-01.
120. See LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra note 119, at 127-28.
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employers continued to discriminate; and unions, though by
the post-war period largely committed to equality in their
constitutional documents and political pronouncements,
struggled to realize these commitments in their dealings with
employers and workers, and in the way their members
treated each other.121 For many liberal scholars and
commentators—and for legal scholars in particular—these
shortcomings have long anchored a simplistic narrative,
rooted in the prioritization of identity over class, and redolent
with a certain contempt for the working class, that sees the
labor movement and its underlying culture of solidarity as
indifferent to if not relentlessly hostile to the interests of
marginalized workers.122 In fact, this narrative is not nearly
so well-founded as its proponents presume. Blacks,
especially, were central to the CIO’s efforts in major
industries like steel and maritime shipping, played an
important role in building the labor movement, and benefited
significantly from its rise in the 1930s and 1940s.123
Moreover, the unions, which spearheaded efforts in the 1930s
and 1940s to stop the lynching of black men, also provided
crucial (though largely unrecognized) support to the civil
rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.124 As we shall see
shortly, there may not have been any employment provision
in the 1964 Civil Rights Act had it not been for the efforts of
unions activists—and had the recommendations of these

121. For a review of these problems and the debates surrounding them, see
PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND
THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008).
122. See, e.g., HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
10, at 4, 12; Crain, supra note 10, at 213, 220, 228-29, 255-56; Hill, The Problem
of Race, supra note 10, at 190, 197, 200; see also Bernstein, Roots of the
‘Underclass,’ supra note 10, at 95-96.
123. See, e.g., NEEDLEMAN, supra note 68, at 19-22 (2003); NELSON, WORKERS ON
WATERFRONT, supra note 68, at 21. On the belated development of this topic
by historians, and for a review of their work, see Eric Arnesen, Up from Exclusion:
Black and White Workers, Rate, and the State of Labor History, 26 REV. AM. HIST.
146 (1998).
THE

124. See FRYMER, supra note 121, at 47; Charlotte Garden & Nancy Leong, “So
Closely Intertwined”: Labor and Racial Solidarity, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1135,
1160-66 (2013).
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activists been needed, there may have been a far more
effective provision on workplace inequality.
E. The Retreat of Solidarity and the Ascent of Bureaucratic
Control
The end of the war left American workers as strongly
positioned as they had ever been to challenge and reshape
the terms of exploitation in the workplace. The two decades
that followed witnessed the most dramatic improvement in
compensation and overall working conditions in American
history. However, conflict is fundamental in the workplace
and these gains were not easily won or defended. The
Supreme Court effectively banned sit-down strikes in 1939
and they faded in frequency, becoming uncommon forms of
protest.125 In the wake of this development, other forms of
worker solidarity came to the forefront. Wildcat strikes and
similar forms of small-scale, often spontaneous shop floor
resistance proliferated, even during the war years. Mass
picketing, characterized by large numbers of workers
engaged in raucous demonstrations, briefly flourished as
well. Mass picketing figured prominently when, with the
close of the war, workers embarked on the greatest strike
wave in American history. On numerous occasions in 1945
and 1946, large assemblages of workers gathered to press
their demands for union recognition, more favorable working
conditions, and political reforms—both for themselves and,
often enough, on behalf of their fellow workers.126
In many ways this upsurge of militant solidarity proved
highly effective. The dramatic increase in the size and
strength of the labor movement was matched by increasing
success in securing contracts that limited employer control in
the workplace, beginning with the most basic prerogatives to
hire, discharge, and discipline workers at will. Nor were
these the only impositions on employers. On the shop floors,
union stewards and activists made deep inroads on
125. Pope, supra note 81, at 46, 47, 98-99, 104-07.
126. See Ahmed A. White, Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass
Picketing and the Dilemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.59,
82-86 (2014) [hereinafter White, Workers Disarmed].
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managers’ and supervisors’ authority, challenging their onceunquestioned rule with union contracts laden with grievance
provisions, and via informal threats of strikes and
slowdowns. This was too much for employers, who
complained that their plants had been taken over by the
workers.127
Of course, this complaint about workers taking over was
only true in a very relative sense. But a relative loss of control
was injury enough and a counterattack was not long in
coalescing. No sooner had the National Labor Relations Act
been deemed constitutional than the business community
embarked on a campaign to amend the law to rein in strikes,
including wildcat strikes and strikes involving mass
picketing, as well as secondary strikes by sympathetic
workers; to affirm the rights of union dissidents to abstain
from membership and to cross picket lines; to preclude
workers organizing across their own class lines, by excluding
supervisors from the protections of the labor law and
instituting special treatment of professionals and skilled
workers; and, in the guise of barring Communists from union
leadership, to purge the labor movement of leftists who had
proved so troublesome to employers’ interests.128 Although
these aims were frustrated through the war years, they were
all realized with the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in the
summer of 1947, which enforced them through a combination
of administrative or judicial injunctions, civil damages,
procedures by which unions could forfeit representative
status, and expanded employer prerogatives to retaliate
against workers. Notably, Taft-Hartley’s passage was
justified as a necessary step in reining in worker solidarity
and restoring the sovereignty of employers in the
workplace.129 In the words of Rick Fantasia, “The act
represented a direct assault on the traditional expressions of
working-class solidarity and action.”130
127. FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 54.
128. See HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARTLEY: A STUDY OF NATIONAL LABOR POLICY AND LABOR RELATIONS 282,
290, 327, 335, 361, 379, 383 (1950).
129. On the campaign to ban mass picketing, via Taft-Hartley and other means,
see generally White, Workers Disarmed, supra note 126, at 86-115.
130. FANTASIA, supra note 21, at 55.
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Already by the early 1950s, the kind of intense solidarity
so evident in the 1930s and 1940s had become somewhat
rare, as the sit-down strikes and mass picketing of that
earlier time were replaced by more conventional “work
stoppages,” which occurred with somewhat less frequency
and much less rancor. Even wildcat strikes and other forms
of shop floor militancy faded, as both unionized and (to a
considerable degree) non-unionized workplaces embraced a
rule-bound, bureaucratized system of management,” which
David Brody calls “workplace contractualism.”131 Workers
and capitalists settled into an uneasy period of détente, in
which unionization was seldom challenged but ceased to
expand into industries and sectors not conquered in the
1930s and 1940s, compensation and working conditions
improved steadily but not dramatically, and employers
nervously guarded their “managerial prerogatives” from
union depredation.132
And so while the labor movement consolidated its
membership rolls and its political standing, it lost vigor and
spontaneity; a bureaucratic ethos and mode of governance
proliferated within unions, at the expense, in part, of the very
culture of solidarity on which the movement had been built.
Any combination of a number of factors might account for this
devolution, including the unique features with which the
labor movement was born in the 1930s (including, for
instance, a measure of top-down authoritarianism); the
particular personalities who happened to lead the labor
movement and the political choices they made; and,
according to some at least, an inherent tendency of unions to
become more conservative over time.133 Almost certainly,
131. DAVID BRODY, Workplace Contractualism in Comparative Perspective, in
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE 176 (Nelson
Lichtenstein & Howel Harris eds., 1993). The degree to which non-unionized
firms adhered to this approach can been seen in the fact that some 80% of large
nonunion firms in the 1950s maintained grievance procedures patterned on those
that could be found in almost all unionized workplaces. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at
92.
132. See generally LICHTENSTEIN, STATE
122-25.
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UNION, supra note 119, at

133. For a review of these arguments, see NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, LABOR’S WAR
WAR II 2-4 (1982).
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though, changes in law and policy, including those codified in
Taft-Hartley, played a role. In compliance with its norms,
strikes became less common, less boisterous, and less
effective; and leftists, who were often at the forefront in
cultivating worker solidarity, were pushed out of the
movement.134
Already by the late 1940s, the culture of solidarity that
flourished in the 1930s and 1940s was in retreat. And yet,
even in this era, the labor movement remained dependent on
solidarity—and for a very basic reason. The rights that the
labor law ostensibly conveys, including that of meaningful
collective bargaining, are necessarily dependent on the same
basic dynamic showcased in Flint and Aliquippa: the ability
of the union to wage an effective strike. And the prospect of
waging an effective strike is entirely dependent on
solidarity—indeed, in the postwar period in some ways even
more so. For, once the law condemned sit-down strikes,
sympathy strikes, and mass picketing, affirmed the right of
workers not to support unions, and validated the prerogative
of employers to replace strikers, the only hope of waging an
effective strike lay in cultivating a deep well of common
identity and commitment among a strong majority of
workers. For their part, the institutions that had defined
employer paternalism earlier in the century—benefits
programs, rules governing employee discipline and
discharge, grievance procedures, and so forth—did not
disappear in the postwar period, so much as they were
incorporated into the institution of collective bargaining. On
the one hand, this turn further diminished the role of shop
floor militancy and other more basic forms of solidarity in
governing the workplace while codifying an insidious kind of
collaborationism.135 On the other hand, the subrogation of
employer control to union representation and collective
bargaining was undeniably effective in subordinating
employer sovereignty to a significant measure of worker
134. On the effects of such legal changes on sit-down strikes, see generally Pope,
supra note 81. On the effects of legal changes on mass picketing, see generally
White, Workers Disarmed, supra note 126, at 111-20.
135. See, e.g., ALICE LYND & STAUGHTON LYND, RANK
HISTORIES OF WORKING-CLASS ORGANIZERS 3-4 (1973).
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influence. From this vantage, one can develop a new
appreciation for the strikes of the 1950s and 1960s, which
though less frequent and less sensational than those of the
1930s and 1940s, were in their own way profound expressions
of solidarity and markers of workers’ continued success in
rolling back the kind of unqualified employer control that had
once prevailed in America.136
In this context, the most immediate threat to workers’
gains unfolded within the workplace itself. With proof before
them of the self-destructive character of both hierarchical
and technical control, employers constructed a new and
potent system for managing their workers: bureaucratic
control. As Edwards recognizes, this system had its origins
before the New Deal as a seemingly logical means of
organizing white collar office workers and was only gradually
embraced as a way of managing the workplace more
generally.137 Another important influence was ERPs, or
company unions, which—ironically—“pushed corporate
leaders to see their firms as institutions best governed by
‘laws’ or rules rather than by management whim and
command.”138 The ERPs were made illegal by section 8(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act and swept aside by the
independent unions that emerged in the 1930s and 1940s.139
But they were influential nonetheless. And the unions that
took root in their place also had an ironic role to play in
shaping the new system of bureaucratic control. For even as
employers “sought to use bureaucratic control to limit the
impact of unions, to draw them into joint disciplining of
workers, and to regain some of [their] lost initiative” they
confronted unions intent on using the “bureaucratization of
the workplace to codify and thereby defend their negotiated

136. An excellent occasion to reflect on this point is Jack Metzger’s very personal
account of steel unionism in the postwar period. See METZGAR, supra note 114. On
the course of labor relations in this period, see generally LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF
THE UNION, supra note 119, at 98-140.
137. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 132.
138. Id. at 109.
139. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (West 2015).
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gains.”140 In this light, bureaucratic control can be seen as an
inherent dimension of Brody’s “workplace contractualism.”
In general, though, the prerogative to define, structure,
and implement bureaucratic control rested with employers.
For unions’ efforts to shape its meaning fell short in the face
of their limited reach and economic power, and
interpretations of the labor law that insulated “managerial
prerogatives” from mandatory collective bargaining.141 As it
came to predominate in most workplaces in the postwar
period, bureaucratic control was fundamentally a system of
employer rule. Its main characteristics are well summarized
by Edwards: “bureaucratic control is embedded in the social
and organizational structure of the firm and is built into job
categories, work rules, promotion procedures, discipline,
wage scales, definitions of responsibilities, and the like.
Bureaucratic control establishes the impersonal force of
‘company rules’ or ‘company policy’ as the basis for control.”142
In compliance with the ethos of the postwar period,
bureaucratic control encapsulates control in the “rule of law,”
which is to say “the firm’s law.” By these means, it
rearticulates power in abstract, formal terms. “Hierarchical
relations [are] transformed from relations between
(unequally powerful) people to relations between jobholders
or relations between jobs themselves, abstracted from the
specific people or the concrete work tasks involved.”143
Edwards harbored no illusions about the true functions
of bureaucratic control, which he regarded as highly
oppressive, deeply exploitative, and corrosive of worker
solidarity. His review of its operationalization at major
employers reveals its tendencies to replace workers’
inclination to identify with each other with a tendency to
embrace “we the firm,” thus “the workplace culture tends to
express less of the worker and more of the firm.”144 A new
140. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 132
141. The key case on this question is First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666, 685-88 (1981).
142. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 131.
143. Id. at 145.
144. Id. at 148.
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paternalism is thus encoded in the workplace. Edwards notes
how the rules often metastasize into totalitarian regimes
that comprehensively regulate workers’ activities, all the
while not only undermining behaviors, like “gambling” or
“horseplay,” that often form the foundation of solidarity, but
specifically banning behaviors that are explicitly solidary.145
Even more perniciously, bureaucratic control, with its
governance via rules of individual employment, drives
workers to take on the project of managing themselves—to
“internalize the enterprise’s goals and values” and become
“self-directed and self-controlled.”146 In all these ways,
bureaucratic control creates and valorizes the oddest of
concepts, at least from a standpoint that recognizes the
inherent conflict of the workplace itself: that of the “good
worker.”
Despite this very pessimistic view of hierarchical control,
Edwards argues that this system of control was nevertheless
saddled with destabilizing contradictions. Among these, he
says, was the tendency of such controls to convert labor costs
into fixed costs, which tends to diminish competitiveness in
the long run. As he suggests, this may indeed have played a
role in deindustrialization, which was rapidly accelerating at
the time he wrote on this subject. Of more immediate
relevance to us, though, is Edwards’ notion that another
contradiction of bureaucratic control rests in its tendency to
incorporate statutorily mandated reforms that benefit
workers—like those encoded in Title VII.147 Here, as we shall
see, Edwards is correct in predicting what would occur but
wrong in failing to see how, in this process, reform would be
distorted and harnessed to employers’ interests.
II. SOLIDARITY REJECTED:
CLASS POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS OF TITLE VII
Enacted fifty years ago, and amended several times since
then, Title VII of the Omnibus Civil Rights Act of 1964
responded to the very real problem of pervasive inequality in
145. Id. at 149.
146. Id. at 150.
147. Id. at 161.
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the workplace.148 In so doing it embraced a peculiar approach
to inequality, one that conceptualized inequality in terms of
discrimination and individual rights, and opened the door to
the expansion of bureaucratic controls in the workplace to the
detriment of worker solidarity. This fateful course was
shaped around a fundamentally political decision—or,
rather, was shaped by the results of a political contest—
regarding the proper government response to the broad
problem of inequality and economic dispossession among
blacks that was the main motivation for its enactment in the
first place. As Judith Stein points out, the political problem
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Congress faced in
1963, and that actually gave rise to Title VII, was not
reducible to discrimination at all, but rather encompassed
the broader challenge of securing better working conditions
for black workers at a tenuous point in the evolution of the
American economy.149
While it may be tempting to think that Title VII emerged
out of the concerns of elite politicians, undergoing some kind
of belated enlightenment on the plight of minority workers,
the real story of its origins is more complicated. At least as
important as the views of congressmen and presidents were
structural forces, including escalating social conflict fueled
by the frustrations of black workers, and international
politics.150 These forces were harnessed and shaped by civil
rights groups, on the one hand, and elements of the labor
movement, on the other, without whose activism there would
have been no statute.151 Prominent among civil rights
organizations were the Urban League; the Congress on
Racial Equality (CORE); the Southern Christian Leadership
148. For a useful review of extent and depth of inequality in the decades
preceding the enactment of Title VII, see, for example, DOBBIN, supra note 18, at
22-31.
149. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 69.
150. On these influences, see generally HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972 (1990); PAUL D.
MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND POLICY IN AMERICA, 1933–1972 (1997).
151. On the many groups that played important roles in securing the enactment
of Title VII, see GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 95-99, 103-04.
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Conference (SCLC); the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and its litigationoriented descendent, by that time an independent
organization, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
(LDF). Particularly important among labor organizations
were the movement’s two preeminent industrial unions,
successors to the organizations that had triumphed only a
quarter century earlier in the struggles at Flint and
Aliquippa: the UAW; and the United Steelworkers of
America (USWA), which evolved from the SWOC. Also
important was the main labor federation, the AFL-CIO,
which then included both of these unions.152 In fact, the
“super lobby,” composed of elements of the civil rights and
labor movement, that was the key force in enacting the Civil
Rights Act, was initiated by UAW president Walter
Reuther.153
Earlier attempts by Congress in the post-war period to
address workplace inequality had made little headway and it
seemed unlikely at first that the Civil Rights Act would
contain any provision on employment.154 But, as pressures
from the civil rights and labor movements to include such a
provision increased, the question emerged: What sort of
provision to adopt? Representatives of the labor movement
joined with left-liberals in supporting legislation that would
have approached the problem of workplace inequality in an
administrative fashion, via a scheme broadly similar to that
used to enforce labor rights under the National Labor
Relations Act. Thus they envisaged that the statute would be
enforced by an agency like the NLRB empowered to
investigate complaints, hold hearings, and issue cease-anddesist orders—all with the autonomy of individual
complainants (and their lawyers) subordinate to agency
discretion, and the courts’ role reduced to that of policing the
152. On the support of these organizations and their representatives for
legislation on this front, see their testimony and statements before the House in
Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211 and S. 1937 Before a Subcomm. on Emp’t &
Manpower of the S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 88th Cong. 229 (1963).
153. ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE
at 56 (1990).

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,

154. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 79.
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agency’s use of its discretion. Beyond this, they contemplated
a program to address workplace inequality (if not a single
statute) that would eschew concern for individual bias and
discrimination in favor of an emphasis on the structural
underpinnings of the problem, including automation,
deindustrialization, and other threats to employment and
labor standards, and would feature proactive, structural
remedies as well.155
To some degree, the unionists’ support for such an
approach reflected self-interests, as leaders of the big unions
were keenly aware of their own checked history on issues of
race and employment and were wary of how far the new law
might go in imposing liability on their organizations if it
hewed to the concepts of individual rights and
discrimination. But to a very considerable degree, their
interests in an administrative and structural approach to
workplace inequality were also rooted in a genuine concern
about the dysfunctions and liabilities that might inhere in
the alternative approach that was in the offing, and a
wariness about reforms that might enhance employers’
power.156 Union leaders were genuinely opposed to workplace
inequality, not least because it undermined the worker
solidarity in which many of them believed and on which the
very existence of their organizations depended.157
There were precursors to labor’s program. The first
important foray of the federal government into this field (not
counting the largely moribund statutes enacted to enforce the
Civil War Amendments), the creation in 1941 of a Fair
Employment Practices Commission, or FEPC, was largely
the result of a campaign led by prominent black labor leader,
155. See MORENO, supra note 150, at 204-09; see also ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE
FIFTH FREEDOM: JOBS, POLITICS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES,
1941–1972, at 209 (2009); STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 77-78.
156. See DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 37; see also STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra
note 5, at 76-78 (discussing the influence of race and unemployment on S. 1937,
88th Cong. (1963)).
157. GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 139. These sentiments are reflected in the
testimony of George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, and David MacDonald,
president of the USWA. Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211 and S. 1937, supra
note 152, at 151-56, 158-59.
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A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping
Car Porters. Established by executive order, this first FEPC
foundered because it lacked enforcement authority,
jurisdictional reach, and political legitimacy.158 An approach
to workplace inequality somewhat more similar to that
advocated by labor in the early 1960s had been instituted
almost two decades earlier by the State of New York, whose
moderately effective state FEPC was modeled on the
NLRB.159 Labor’s support for structural reforms to address
workplace inequality was also anticipated by political
proposals and arguments in the lead up to debates about the
1964 legislation. Among these were precautions from Labor
Secretary, Willard Wirtz, and from Leon Keyserling, the
main author of the original National Labor Relations Act,
who warned against the dangers of an approach to workplace
inequality that did not feature structural reforms.160
Labor’s program was encoded in legislation sponsored by
Senator Hubert Humphrey (who ultimately shepherded Title
VII through the Senate). Humphrey’s bill, S. 1937, would
have established an administrative agency very similar to
the NLRB with both an administrator (like the NLRB’s
general counsel) charged with enforcing the law, and a fiveperson adjudicative board (similar to the NLRB itself, as
distinct from the agency). The agency would have had the
authority to investigate instances in which employers (or
unions) infringed on the “equal employment opportunity of
any individual,” and to sanction such acts directly by means
of cease-and-desist orders, back pay, and disqualification
from government contracts.161 The bill also called for “a
nationwide
effort . . . to
secure
equal
employment
opportunity by the affirmative and conscious efforts of
government, employers, unions, and others.”162 In hearings
on his bill in the House, Humphrey specifically described the
legislation as a necessary response to workplace inequality
(the plight of the “Negro American”) in a time of escalating
158. GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 10-11.
159. Id. at 19-22.
160. See id. at 83-84, 101-02; see also STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5,
at 75.
161. See Equal Employment Opportunity, S. 1937, 88th Cong. §§ 3-6 (1963).
162. Id. § 2.
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deindustrialization. He urged that the problem of workplace
inequality must be confronted “in its totality,” including
“practices not directly related to overt discrimination.”
Invoking the substance of the structural approach alluded to
in the bill, he made clear his view the new agency created by
the legislation would be expected to work with many other
state and federal agencies to address not only discrimination
but the broader problem of a lack of good jobs for black
workers.163
Labor supported Humphrey’s bill over the alternatives,
which eschewed its administrative and structural approach.
AFL-CIO president George Meany explained his preference
for S. 1937 by telling the House Subcommittee on
Employment and Labor that the bill’s failure to mention
“discrimination” was a good thing, for “[w]e are today
considering more than just discrimination . . . . We are
thinking in terms of repairing those ill practices which have
been prevalent for a century.”164 Walter Reuther, who
commanded considerable respect in the civil rights
movement, submitted a statement to the Subcommittee that
expressed his support for S. 1937 in similar terms. Reuther
insisted that the problem of workplace inequality was such
that “we need to do more than merely treat the specific
grievances of a few brave souls who file a complaint.” Rather,
“what we need . . . is a greatly improved economic climate, a
climate of full employment,” and thus a response that
included support not only for Keynesian stimulation but
public works, “manpower” initiatives, and the like. He
therefore supported the Humphrey bill because it would
encourage such affirmative steps to maintain a healthy labor
market.165
The Humphrey bill was doomed by conservative
opposition to its ambitious program and a preference among
civil rights supporters and congressional moderates for
legislation founded on the concepts of litigation and

163. Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, S. 1211 and S. 1937, supra note 152, at 135-46.
164. Id. at 157.
165. Id. at 168-69.
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individual discrimination.166 The bill that did become law,
H.R. 7152, embodied a set of compromises, many of them
brokered by Senator Everett Dirksen, a moderate
Republican, that thoroughly repudiated the agenda in
Humphrey’s bill.167 To some extent, the preferences embodied
in the law that was adopted reflected an inertial predilection
for the typical approach to workplace inequality embraced by
state fair employment practice commissions (of which there
were around twenty at the time), albeit watered down to
remove
their
investigative
and
cease-and-desist
prerogatives.168 The Humphrey bill and its approach also
suffered, ironically, from resentments about the success of
the NLRB as a vehicle for advancing labor rights. With
complete disregard for the outrageous antics on the part of
businesses that had made the NLRB’s aggressive
enforcement practices necessary in the first place,
congressional conservatives criticized the idea of a federal
employment agency modeled after the NLRB by resurrecting
arguments they had deployed in the 1930s and 1940s
regarding that agency’s supposed congenital unfairness.169
Another reason that the structural, administrative
approach yielded to the individual rights, litigation-based
approach, as Judith Stein points out, is that it also clashed
with the politics and social premises of the larger liberal
establishment, whose embrace of the War on Poverty
(launched while the Civil Rights Act was moving through
Congress) reflected a growing preference to confront social
inequality, not in structural terms, but as the product of
personal factors, like deficient education and a “culture of
poverty,” and inadequate aggregate economic demand.170 In
166. See STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 84; see also CHEN, supra note
155, at 172-73, 184-90.
167. For a discussion of Everett Dirksen’s amendments to Humphrey’s bill, see
STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 81-86.
168. See GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 129-32.
169. See id. at 130-31. On the course and character of these earlier attacks on
the NLRB, see generally JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD (1981).
170. See STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 72-76. On liberalism’s
conceptualization of employment policy in Keynesian, rather than structural,

1106

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

other words, for liberal elites and their supporters in
Congress and the White House, the problem of workplace
inequality, like that of inequality more generally, was
increasingly one of “human relations, where morality and
democracy demanded the abolition of actions based upon
prejudice.”171 Structural factors might be important, but
mainly as mediated by the dynamics of discrimination and
individual aggrievement. Although some civil rights leaders
did agree with labor on the need for structural reform, the
movement as a whole did not join with labor in pressing for a
more comprehensive approach to workplace inequality. Their
main concern was getting any functional bill enacted.172
These dynamics were fully embodied in the statute that
was finally adopted. A remarkably thin, even intellectually
weak, document, the new law fully embraced the idea of
discrimination against individuals as the central problem of
workplace inequality, as it invested individuals with the
right to sue if denied employment or otherwise discriminated
against in the employment context on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Critically, the law did little
to actually define what was meant by workplace
discrimination.173 Although the statute created an Equal
Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC), unlike the
NLRB, the Agency initially lacked any authority whatsoever
to adjudicate violations of the law; indeed, the Agency could
not even sue in cases of discrimination.174 And although
amendments in 1972 granted the EEOC authority to sue on
behalf of individuals, the Agency remains structured in a way
that leaves it unable to prosecute more than a few dozen such
cases each year.175 Even today, enforcement of the statute is
terms, see GARY MUCCIARONI, THE POLITICAL FAILURE
1945–1982, at 7, 20-22, 34-44 (1990).

OF

EMPLOYMENT POLICY,

171. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 78.
172. Id. at 79-80.
173. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 34-37.
174. As enacted, Title VII empowered the EEOC to seek a voluntary settlement
in cases where a violation of the law occurred. If such efforts failed, a complainant
would be left to sue in her own behalf.
175. Congress accomplished this change via the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act. In fiscal year 2013, the EEOC filed only seventy-eight
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almost completely dependent on voluntary compliance
backed by the threat of private litigation.176 And because of
the way it was designed without something like the NLRB
positioned to actively enforce the law and with a reliance on
private litigation to enforce its norms, Title VII implicitly
nominates employers and their managers as the parties best
endowed with the relevant information and necessary power
to implement its norms.177
The statute makes absolutely no provision for instituting
the kinds of structural reforms that at the time it was
enacted already seemed essential to advancing the interests
of the workers it was enacted to help. The law’s singular
orientation to discrimination divested it of any capacity to
tackle overarching structural realities that formed the
landscape of workplace inequality. Instead, “Title VII
translated labor issues into discourses about a bias unrelated
to the changing economy.”178 It affirmed dualisms—for
example, the racist versus the non-racist, the sexist versus
the non-sexist—that “simplified social reality.”179 Ironically,
while the new law explicitly prohibited segregation in
employment, as a matter of policy, it actually segregated
“racial and economic policies” from each other.180
In other words, by framing the grievances of workers in
terms of discrimination, the statute left untended the more
fundamental threat facing these men and women in the form
of aggregate job losses occasioned by automation,
deindustrialization, and other structural changes then
overtaking the American economy. The economy of the late
1950s and early 1960s was more tenuous than many now
enforcement suits involving Title VII claims. EEOC Litigation Statistics, FY 1997
through FY 2014, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/
litigation.cfm (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
176. In fact, in its early years of operation, the EEOC was substantially
dependent on civil rights lawyers connected to the NAACP to do its work. See
FRYMER, supra note 121, at 41-42.
177. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 40.
178. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 70.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 69-70.
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appreciate. But for a time the boom of the late 1960s, built on
escalating social spending and both the Keynesian and laborforce-reducing effects of the Cold War and the Vietnam War,
improved labor market conditions and concealed the dangers.
But by the early 1970s, the job market was rapidly
deteriorating and the entire working class began a descent
into a period of sustained retrenchment which has lasted into
this century.181 Black workers, ostensibly the main
beneficiaries of Title VII, would suffer worse than most, not
least because all hopes for the development a program of
comprehensive workplace equality—let alone a campaign to
protect all workers from impeding structural changes—had
essentially been lost with the enactment of Title VII.
Liberalism had struck a new course.182
As Stein points out, building conflicts over jobs were
shaped not only by the terms of Title VII, but by other forces,
including the fact that even as Title VII was passed, the civil
rights movement was then morphing into an institution
dominated by lawyers and other professionals, as well as by
race militants who frequently possessed no particular
program at all. For the civil rights lawyers, many were wellschooled in conventional, adversarial litigation as they were
ignorant of workplace politics and administrative practice—
the idea of tackling the problem of workplace inequality with
anything other than private litigation was unappealing; and
of course there was the added fact that such a regime would
favor them professionally.183 Most fundamentally, as legal
historian Risa Goluboff points out, by the 1960s the civil
rights establishment, and civil rights lawyers in particular,
were well along in rejecting class as a salient component of
their activism—and well-disposed to subordinate class to
181. Id. at 87-88.
182. As Stein points out, after Title VII was enacted, Humphrey attempted to
convince President Lyndon Johnson to augment its discrimination and individual
rights approach with structural interventions. In a clear harbinger of the new
direction of liberalism, Johnson declined. A later attempt to amend the law to
align it more closely with S. 1937 failed. Id. at 87. So did an extended effort, also
spearheaded by Humphrey, to pass a full employment bill in the late 1970s. See
JEFFERSON COWIE, STAYIN’ ALIVE: THE 1970S AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE WORKING
CLASS 270-88 (2010).
183. See STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 91, 102-06, 116-17.
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race.184 For their part, militants in the movement
increasingly hewed to a position which anticipated the “New
Left’s” reckless, self-justificatory maxim that unions were
inherently dysfunctional and reactionary.185 And both elites
and activists in the civil rights movement during this period
were increasingly keen on the racialization of social problems
generally. This, too, was the functional corollary of their
growing indifference and hostility to the labor movement—
sentiments that would soon manifest within the women’s
movement as well.186 Not only did Title VII itself reflect a
change in the meaning of postwar liberalism; it was born
into, and further shaped by, this world in which the political
significance of labor and class was rapidly diminishing.
In this political and economic context, it was inevitable
that the statute’s imprisonment to the concept of
discrimination would give rise to another set of dysfunctions:
as black workers pressed individual discrimination claims
(sometimes aggregated among groups of workers) in a
deteriorating job market which featured fewer and fewer
opportunities for promotions, or even positions of any kind,
they inevitably aggravated conflicts between themselves and
white workers. And although these claims typically
implicated employers as authors of discriminatory policies
(something that, as early opponents of Title VII’s approach
predicted, sometimes annoyed and alienated employers that
were actually inclined to support workplace reforms), they
conspicuously relieved the business community of any
obligations to support the kinds of structural reforms that
might improve the employment situation of all workers.
Worse, the conflict that the pursuit of discrimination claims
in this context inspired among workers reduced worker
solidarity, which then weakened the unions which had
served (however imperfectly) as their strongest means of
institutional support—and which, ironically, had played such
an important role in securing the passage of the civil rights
law in the first place. Moreover, the idea of cleansing the
workplace of discrimination—conceived, again, in simplistic,
individualist
terms—was
quickly
subordinated
to
184. Goluboff, supra note 5, at 1979.
185. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 90-91.
186. See id. at 89-91.
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managerial interests. In these ways, as the next Part shows,
Title VII facilitated the triumph of bureaucratic control over
worker solidarity.
III. TITLE VII AND THE TRIUMPH OF
BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OVER WORKER SOLIDARITY
Several years after Title VII came into effect, Alfred
Blumrosen, recently advisor to the EEOC and civil rights
lawyer with the Justice Department, authored a book in
which he strongly defended the Agency and the law against
criticisms concerning their effectiveness and the wisdom with
which they were conceived. Blumrosen was particularly keen
to refute the charge that the statute was misconceived in its
reliance on private lawsuits. He advanced a number of
arguments to support this claim, including an assertion that
dependence on administrative processes was a “hallmark” of
the ineffective, state-level workplace employment agencies
that preceded the EEOC; and the idea that invocation of the
NLRB as a superior organizational template was inapt, not
least because of the institutional weaknesses of the civil
rights movement compared to the labor movement.187 Most
striking, though, was Blumrosen’s claim that an
administrative approach to workplace inequality would place
an agency “in loco parentis for the victims of discrimination”
and, as such, would have instituted a kind of “paternalism”
of the sort that underlay “monstrous” injustices in American
history and offended the precepts of a “pluralistic” society.188
What Blumrosen failed to comprehend—what his own
complementary faith in civil rights liberalism and the
pluralist potential of American society likely concealed from
him—was that, for workers, the more immediate threat of
paternalism inhered not in agency actions, but in the
employment relationship itself; and that the very law he was
defending as a bulwark against paternalism was in fact
abetting its resurgence in a particularly incipient form and
at the direct expense of worker solidarity.
Over the last several decades, the congenital tendencies
of Title VII to undermine worker solidarity not only
187. ALFRED BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 3-50 (1972).
188. Id. at 48-49.
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continued to unfold, but converged with other tendencies in
law, which have only increased over this period, to affirm and
enhance bureaucratic control in the workplace. For over the
last few decades, Title VII has entrenched employers—the
very institutions and people whose practices were most
responsible for workplace inequality in the first place—as the
main line of protection for workers against discrimination.
Although evident in many subtle ways, this process can be
seen most clearly in two successive developments: in
litigation surrounding seniority plans in the 1960s and
1970s; and beginning in the 1970s, in the way the law has
evolved to govern claims of workplace harassment, and in the
way employers responded to legal changes in this realm.
A. Seniority Plans, Bureaucratic Control, and the
Fracturing of Workplace Solidarity
From the very outset, efforts to effectuate Title VII
devolved into struggles between groups of workers over
scarce resources, particularly in what were then the major
centers of remunerative working class employment and the
anchors of the postwar labor movement—manufacturing and
basic industry. In line with Stein’s thesis, these increasingly
dysfunctional conflicts could be traced to the statute itself.
Not only did Title VII’s individualist, antidiscrimination
orientation prefigure conflict among workers; in this context
more than any, the statute established itself as a key
instance in the larger evolution of post-war liberalism,
marked by a turn away from the very idea of rational
industrial planning, as well as an indifference, at best, to the
devastating
consequences
of
automation,
deindustrialization, and a renewed rapaciousness among the
business class.189
The most important battleground in the early stages of
this unfortunate struggle was the contest over seniority
plans, which proliferated in the post-war workplace and were
ubiquitous in union shops when Title VII became effective.190
189. See JUDITH STEIN, PIVOTAL DECADE: HOW THE UNITED STATES TRADED
FACTORIES FOR FINANCE IN THE 1970S (2010) [hereinafter STEIN, PIVOTAL DECADE];
STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5.
190. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 55.
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Seniority plans were a marker of workers’ successful
participation, through unions, in the construction of elements
of bureaucratic control that benefited themselves. In part
because of pressure from unions, which typically secured
such plans in their collective bargaining agreements, Title
VII was enacted with some accommodation for seniority.191
Section 703(h) of the statute bars liability where differences
in the terms or conditions of employment are the product of
a bona fide seniority or merit plan. The gravamen of bona
fides, or rather the lack thereof, is whether the plan was
adopted with a prohibited, discriminatory purpose, like
benefiting white workers over blacks, or men over women—
even if adopted prior to the enactment of Title VII. If lacking
in such prohibited purpose, the plan is legitimate even if its
effects are discriminatory.192
On its face, this doctrine actually seems overly
burdensome to plaintiffs. For whether they intended to or
not, many unions and employers had been complicit, mainly
via collective bargaining, in instituting seniority plans that
left minorities and women at a disadvantage. Because they
tended to be hired more recently, many minorities and
women lacked overall seniority and were thus more exposed
to across-the-board layoffs. Where seniority was
administered in separate “lines” among different
departments, as was often the case, others found themselves
deterred from transferring out of lower paying departments
because doing so required that they lose accrued seniority
and thus suffer diminution of pay and heightened risks of
layoff. Moreover, many seniority plans with such effects had
been established years, even decades, earlier; and if ever
there had been clear evidence of discriminatory purpose in
establishing them, such evidence could almost never be
produced by plaintiffs.193 The situation seemed to warrant
both a more flexible conception of discrimination and a
remedy uniquely suited to these problems, in particular the
institution of some sort of remedial or “rightful place”
seniority which would reassign workers to rectify the
191. GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 139-40.
192. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
193. See FRYMER, supra note 121, at 40; MORENO, supra note 150, at 238-44;
STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 45-46.
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discriminatory effects of seniority plans that lacked bona
fides. Such an approach had not been anticipated in the text
of Title VII. In order for it to be adopted required creative
manipulation of Title VII’s substantive and procedural norms
and legal and political pressure on the EEOC and the courts.
In this regard, the efforts of liberal lawyers, like the LDF’s
Jack Greenberg, and crusaders like Herbert Hill—a civil
rights lawyer with the NAACP who displayed a rather
consuming dislike for organized labor—proved essential and
effective in prodding first the EEOC and then the courts.194
To this day, both a flexible notion of discrimination and
the concept of remedial seniority strike most liberals as
entirely appropriate ways of undermining white or male
“privilege” in the workplace. But in practice, the true equities
proved controversial in ways that few liberals have been
inclined to admit. For in ways that leftist critics could
certainly have anticipated when Title VII was enacted,
claims involving seniority inevitably arose in the context of
diminishing employment opportunities; and remedial
seniority often meant the imposition of significant costs on
workers who had nothing to do with the enactment of these
plans.195 In other words, the very dynamic that trapped many
minorities and women in less advantageous seniority lines
portended that intra-class conflict and acrimony would follow
from any effort to address this problem with the tools
provided by Title VII.
In several important instances in which remedial
seniority was first employed—in cases from the steel and
lumber industries involving discrimination against black
workers—its dubious politics were laid bare by the
complexities of job classification, training, and rank, and by
the complex political realities on the ground.196 These cases
include Paperworkers v. Local 189 and Quarels v. Philip
194. FRYMER, supra note 121, at 40-41; STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at
105-06, 112, 116; FRYMER, supra note 121, at 40-41.
195. On the nature of this problem and the legal principles that evolved around
it, see Title VII—Seniority—The Relevant Scope of Inquiry for Determining the
Legality of the System, 31 VAND. L. REV. 151 (1978).
196. One of these cases is familiar to students of discrimination law: Local 189,
United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 984 (5th Cir. 1969); see also
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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Morris, which are celebrated by civil rights lawyers and
scholars as high points in the aggressive application of Title
VII. However, in such cases, as Stein makes very clear, the
attempt to fashion workable remedies ended in something of
a debacle. Complicated schemes imposed by the judges and
endorsed by EEOC and civil rights lawyers not only
exacerbated racial conflict among workers, but also failed to
consistently profit their supposed beneficiaries. Indeed, such
was the cumbersome nature of these remedies that quite a
few older black workers were expressly disadvantaged by
their imposition. Perhaps worse, Title VII’s narrow
conception of workplace inequality guaranteed that the
remedies would be indifferent to the broader and longer-term
consequences of automation and offshoring and the resulting
escalation of job scarcity that made seniority important to
workers in the first place.197
In this context, the one thing that the law did accomplish
was to “enhanc[e] corporate power.”198 For despite the fact
that the companies were primarily responsible for instituting
such discriminatory plans in the first place, remedial
remedies imposed almost nothing on their interests. In fact,
the companies actually benefited from the conflict generated
by the remedies, as this exacerbated fractures and tensions
among their workers.199 Amidst the litigation and political
conflict surrounding the remedies, employers could
occasionally position themselves as protectors of some
workers while generally remaining aloof from the conflicts
that arose between groups of workers. As a consequence,
remedial seniority reflected what Stein calls a “perverse”
kind of liberalism “defined as gains for . . . some members of
the working class at the expense of other[s].”200 Workplace
inequality thus became a problem among workers, not
between employers and workers. Tragically, things need not
have gone this way. For in hindsight, this whole business of
seniority seemed like exactly the kind of complicated problem
that would have been much better confronted, not by
adversarial litigation built around claims of discrimination,
197. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 110-45.
198. Id. at 117.
199. Id. at 117.
200. Id. at 185.
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but by the combination of negotiation, expert administration,
and most of all structural reforms, that labor’s critics of Title
VII had said should have been applied to the problem in the
first place.
The flexible notion of discrimination on which the
remedial seniority cases depended was, at root, the idea that
discrimination could be established via a process of burden
shifting in the absence of explicit proof of such animus. In
1971, the Supreme Court seemed to give impetus to remedial
seniority when it validated this so-called “disparate impact”
theory of discrimination.201 In 1976, in Franks v. Bowman
Transportation, the Court also endorsed the idea of remedial
remedies for discriminatory seniority plans even in cases
involving competition for scarce resources.202 But the very
next year the Court moved in a different direction when it
decided International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States.203 The case involved minority truckers’ claim that,
having been earlier shunted into a lower paying department,
they were disproportionately affected by a policy that caused
them to forfeit accumulated seniority when they transferred
into a more favorable department. The court rejected the
claim and the associated remedy, evidencing a concern that
a retroactive remedy might be excessively unfair to
incumbent workers (in the case at hand, workers already laid
off). In essence, the Court directed lower courts and the
EEOC to be more careful in balancing the competing
interests and equities before imposing remedial seniority.204
The Court quickly extended its ruling in Teamsters. In
United Airlines v. Evans, it applied the reasoning of
Teamsters to a case where the offensive discrimination,
though no longer in practice, had occurred after Title VII was
enacted.205 In 1989, in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, the
Court clarified the relevance of disparate impact theory in
discrimination cases when it ruled that in the absence of
201. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971).
202. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774-75 (1976).
203. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977).
204. Id. at 355-56.
205. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1977).
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“discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the
system has some discriminatory consequence.”206 In the wake
of these and similar decisions, successful challenges to
seniority plans that are not manifestly the product of
intentional discrimination are essentially impossible.
However, any inclination to celebrate this development as an
ironic and belated nod to worker solidarity by conservative
judges runs up against not only the injustices that many
minority and women workers endured, but the fact that most
pernicious implications of Title VII’s problematic encounter
with seniority had already reshaped the political landscape
of labor rights.
By the time Teamsters was decided, the institutional
solidarity between the labor movement and the civil rights
movement, which may have actually strengthened in the
struggle to enact the civil rights law, was much eroded, the
victim in large part of conflicts over seniority.207 Scores of
Title VII suits alleging discrimination by unions, many of
them seniority cases filed with the support of the LDF, had
been decided in the federal courts; and over the same period,
unions had been subjected to thousands of charges of
discrimination before the EEOC.208 “Civil rights lawyers
besieged unions with lawsuits.”209 Unions’ litigation costs
skyrocketed, and some were even driven into bankruptcy.210
These developments undoubtedly contributed to some
increase in diversity in union ranks, particularly among the
smaller trade unions (many of them old AFL unions) that
were traditionally more discriminatory; but the political and
social costs were extremely high. Worker solidarity suffered
enormously while liberals and civil rights advocates
increasingly saw, in conflicts over seniority, proof that unions
were the embodiment of white, male, majoritarian excesses.
206. Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 905 (1989) (quoting Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82 (1977)).
207. FRYMER, supra note 121, at 41-42.
208. Id. at 88-89.
209. Id. at 94.
210. Id. at 90-94.
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In this way, the campaign to institute and defend remedial
seniority became a cornerstone in liberalism’s substantial
repudiation of the very idea of unionism.211 In perfect
alignment with the class biases of the liberal elites, whose
own burgeoning endowments were increasingly beyond
criticism, the beleaguered white working man became the
very image of race and gender “privilege.” Neither
institutional nor rank-and-file solidarity could survive well
in such a context. Amidst these developments, in the words
of historian Jefferson Cowie, the divide between the labor
movement and the civil rights movement became “an
unbridgeable chasm.”212
In the meantime, the campaign against seniority plans
also abetted employers’ bids to reassert control within the
workplace. This occurred in two ways. First, the political and
economic costs of defending the plans contributed directly to
a weakening of the labor movement, rendering unions less
able to resist employers on the shop floor and in contract
negotiations, and less able to assert themselves politically. In
a telling display of how thoroughly its power had been
diminished, the labor movement suffered a devastating
defeat in its bid to secure modest but much needed reforms
of the labor law in 1977 and 1978.213 Second, the seniority
plans, whatever their defects, were themselves very
substantial impositions on employer control—indeed, in
many ways, they represented the quintessence of postwar
labor’s success in limiting employers’ prerogatives over the
all-important issues of layoffs and tenure. Legal and political
attacks on the plans thoroughly undermined their
legitimacy, to the point that the very word seniority came to
serve liberal commentators as shorthand for union racism
211. As important as seniority in this larger conflict over the meaning and
direction of postwar liberalism was not so much the matter of seniority but rather
the right of minority workers in unionized workplaces to pursue interests and
avenues of protest contrary to the positions taken by their union’s leadership. The
key case on the question is Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975). For a discussion of the case, the political conflicts surrounding it,
and their central role in this larger conflict over the meaning of liberalism, see
Reuel E. Schiller, The Emporium Capwell Case: Race, Labor Law, and the Crisis
of Post-War Liberalism, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 129 (2004).
212. COWIE, supra note 182, at 237.
213. Id. at 288-96.
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and sexism. In the balance, the whole concept of collective
bargaining suffered.
Even as these political and ideological dynamics
unfolded, the conflict over seniority was almost entirely
mooted by the very problem which labor’s critics of Title VII
had feared would arise if workplace inequality were not
confronted on a structural level: the dramatic retrenchment
of employment conditions in the very industries where
seniority plans proliferated and where the labor movement
was anchored. In the steel industry, home to over a halfmillion workers in the 1960s, diversity was advanced by a
series of consent decrees, including a landmark 1974
agreement which undertook to settle several hundred claims
of discrimination involving seniority plans, among other
things, that had been lodged by blacks, Hispanics, and
women, against nine major steel companies.214 But by the late
1970s, the entire industry was in freefall, as bedrock
companies like Jones & Laughlin, Republic, and Bethlehem,
battered by a political economy that eschewed any semblance
of industrial planning, began their long slides into
liquidation and dismemberment. Although blacks’ entry into
higher paying jobs increased, overall black employment in
steel fell from over 38,000 in 1974 to less than 10,000 in 1988;
and the consent decrees, which affected 350,000 workers in
1974, applied to only 135,000 in 1988.215 Just as critics had
worried would happen, the reality of employment
discrimination had shifted from a question of how to assign
job opportunities, to a tragic dispute about whom should be
fired.216
B. Workplace Harassment, the Corrosion of Worker
Solidarity, and the Extension of Bureaucratic Control
Even before litigation surrounding seniority plans had
fully faded, the tendency inherent in Title VII to undermine
214. On the consent decree and its limitations, see BRUCE NELSON, DIVIDED WE
STAND: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 279-84
(2001); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlem Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826,
834-39 (5th Cir. 1975).
215. STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, supra note 5, at 177-95.
216. COWIE, supra note 182, at 243.
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worker solidarity began to coalesce in another realm: in
causes of action premised on workplace harassment based on
attributes, including race, sex, religion, and national origin,
that are protected by the Act. Typically described as “abusive
working environment” or “hostile environment” cases, these
claims can be founded on the actions of employers
themselves, or their supervisors. But their perverse
implications are most fully realized in the way they regulate
conduct between coworkers. Like the treatment of seniority
systems, the operationalization of anti-harassment norms
has directly corroded worker solidarity, primarily by
positioning employers as protectors of workers against each
others’ ostensibly abusive behaviors. Even more so than
remedial seniority, this corrosion of solidarity has entailed
the expansion of bureaucratic control.
Although the intellectual foundations of harassment
claims were laid out in the 1970s by a number of scholars,
lawyers, and activists, foremost among them was Catherine
MacKinnon, who concerned herself primarily with sexual
harassment.217 MacKinnon’s prominence is justified, given
that her definition of sexual harassment was eventually
adopted by the Supreme Court.218 But MacKinnon’s writings
on the subject are also exemplary in another way. Although
MacKinnon’s 1979 book on sexual harassment is very
effective in showing the real harms that sexual harassment
inflicts on women, the book, along with the rest of
MacKinnon’s scholarship, is devoid of any concern at all for
the way prosecuting and preventing harassment under Title
VII might actually dramatically enhance employer
sovereignty in the workplace at the expense of class
solidarity.219 Indeed, by her indifference to this question,
MacKinnon embodies a tendency evident earlier among civil
217. See DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 192-93; Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace,
supra note 14, at 2079-82. Among other important figures in articulating and
publicizing the concept of sexual harassment, see CARROLL M. BRODSKY, THE
HARASSED WORKER (1976); LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978).
218. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-69 (1986).
219. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
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rights lawyers, but also common among feminists, to
subordinate concerns about social class and collective
interests generally to identity politics and notions of
individual rights. Ironically, this move, which reduces the
concept of class conflict and struggle to its own terms (for
many of this ilk, class is cognizable primarily as “classism”),
is conspicuous for the way it leaves unchallenged the class
interests and sensibilities of those who embrace it.220
To be sure, elite lawyers were not the only figures behind
the development of this concept. Among others who were
important in validating the concept of sexual harassment
were unions and union officials, including Kathleen Nolan of
the Screen Actors Guild.221 Nor is this the only connection
between the concept and the labor movement. For when
employers eventually set out to police against harassment in
the workplace, they frequently modeled their rules and
procedures on union grievance machinery developed after the
Second World War.222 Although also quite ironic, in light of
the ultimate implications of harassment policies, these
genetic connections to the labor movement reflect something
we have already seen both in our general review of the
history of control and in our discussion of seniority: the
limited ways in which organized labor in the postwar period
participated in the construction of bureaucratic control.
The idea of protecting workers from harassment at the
hands of their fellow workers is commendable. And the
doctrines that emerged, like the move against discriminatory
seniority, were concerned with a real problem in the
workplace, one that involves not only the more familiar (and
more influential) subject of sexual harassment, but also
racial and other kinds of harassment.223 Our earlier review of
220. On the conflicted place of class in postwar feminism generally, see
DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT: WORKPLACE JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA 227-28 (2005).
221. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 193.
222. Id. at 91-97, 105-06.
223. The EEOC actually receives more charges involving claims of racial
harassment than it does charges involving sexual harassment. Compare Charges
Alleging Race and Harassment, FY 1997–FY 2014, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/race_harassment.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2015), with
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the history of Title VII anticipates, though, that the problem
is not with the basic goals of harassment law but with how
the law is framed and how it actually operates. In this
instance, the relevant doctrines evolved in ways that have, in
the guise of affirming the duty of employers to prevent and
mitigate harassing activity, directly entrenched the role of
employers as protectors of workers from each other and, in
the balance, extended bureaucratic control.
How this occurs varies somewhat depending on the form
of harassment, as harassment claims are of two types.
Employers may be liable if they or their supervisors demand
favors in exchange for workplace benefits—so-called quid pro
quo or “tangible benefit” harassment.224 And they may also be
liable where they either create or suffer the existence of
conduct that creates a “hostile work environment.”225 While
quid pro quo harassment is, of its nature, virtually always
limited to claims involving sex, hostile work environment
claims may implicate race, color, religion, and national
origin, as well as sex. The hallmark of a harassment claim is
a pattern of abusive conduct, not limited to physical acts, but
possibly based on verbal conduct as well. In general, the
conduct must be both subjectively unwelcome and, from the
standpoint of a reasonable person, objectively abusive; it
must also be “severe or pervasive” to the point that it

Charges Alleging Sexual Harassment FY 2010–FY 2014, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm
(last visited Oct. 20, 2015). In fact, although first endorsed by courts in the context
of sexual harassment in 1976—and not at first embraced by all courts—the
concept of workplace harassment has been recognized in the context of national
origin harassment as early as 1971. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971) (noting Congress’s purpose of eliminating ethnic and racial
discrimination); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (D.D.C. 1976)
(finding sex discrimination when male supervisor took retaliatory actions against
female employee because she rejected his sexual advances). For early cases
rejecting sexual harassment claims under Title VII, see, for example, Corne v.
Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
224. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
225. These two types of liability are elaborated by the Supreme Court in an early
case validating hostile work environment claims. Id. at 64-68, 73.
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significantly impairs the victim’s ability to work or their wellbeing.226
Although Title VII imposes liability on employers as
entities—not on individual workers, even those of high
rank—employers are liable for the conduct of their employees
under an agency theory. However, how this plays out
depends on who authors the offensive conduct. Two Supreme
Court cases decided together in 1998, Burlington Industries
v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, proved
important in firming up doctrine, particularly where the
actions of managers and supervisors are implicated.227
According to Ellerth and Faragher, liability is strictly
imposed, unless the employer can prove by a preponderance
of evidence that it had taken reasonable and timely steps to
“prevent and correct” harassment, and the employee making
the claim of harassment “unreasonably failed” to make use of
available remedial procedures.228
Inherent in this affirmative defense is that an employer
can diminish its exposure to liability by enacting rules
barring workplace harassment, establishing procedures by
which victims of harassment can lodge complaints, and
acting diligently in cases where complaints are filed to
remedy the harassment and prevent its recurrence. In the
language of Ellerth itself, an employer will avoid liability if it
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct” the
harassment and the plaintiff failed to avail herself of these
preventative or corrective measures.229 The preventative
measures generally must entail some formal policy barring
harassment, as well as a complaint procedure. 230
Significantly, courts judge the sufficiency of the employer’s
corrective response not only by its promptness but also with
regard to whether it is sufficiently punitive under the
226. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993).
227. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
228. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
229. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
230. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Gordon v. Shafer Contracting Co., 469
F.3d 1191, 1195 (8th Cir. 2006).
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circumstances.231 And, with ironic implications which we will
explore below, courts have likewise taken quite seriously the
injunction that workers who fail to avail themselves of these
procedures essentially forfeit their harassment claims.
Hostile environment claims are treated somewhat
differently where the harassment comes not from the
employer or a supervisor, but a coworker of equal or nearly
equal rank.232 In fact, harassment claims involving
complaints against coworkers are more common than those
involving supervisors.233 In dictum, the Faragher Court
endorsed a negligence standard for such cases employed at
the time by most courts and the EEOC itself. The employer
is liable if it “knew or should have known” of the harassment
and failed to rectify the problem.234 Although the affirmative
defense is not directly applicable, and although the mere
existence of such rules may sometimes increase an
employer’s exposure, with claims involving coworkers, too, an
employer may avoid liability by having in place effective
policies banning workplace harassment and by deploying

231. See, e.g., Loughman v. Malnati Org., Inc., 395 F.3d 404, 408 (7th Cir. 2005);
Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 664 (6th Cir. 1999).
232. The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the definition of supervisors for
purposes of harassment claims under Title VII. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.
Ct. 2434, 2447-50, 2454 (2013).
233. At least, this is true of sexual harassment claims. See SOC’Y
RES. MGMT., SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 6 (1999).

FOR

HUMAN

234. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (quoting Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc.,
108 F.3d 429, 438 (1st Cir. 1997)); see also Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626
F.3d 382, 392 (7th Cir. 2010); Cross v. Prairie Meadows Racetrack & Casino, Inc.,
615 F.3d 977, 984-85 (8th Cir. 2010). More specifically, courts have generally held
that
[t]o establish a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must
establish that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was exposed
to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected
characteristic of the plaintiff; (4) the harassment affected a term,
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or
should have known about the harassing behavior, but failed to take
proper action to alleviate it.
Arraleh v. Cty. of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 978 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Al-Zubaidy v.
TEK Indus., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2005)).
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them in cases where harassment has occurred. 235
Importantly, as is also true in cases involving supervisors, an
employer is more likely to avoid liability if it inflicts serious
punishment on the harasser, and such punishment is
likewise evaluated for its deterrent effect.236
The advantages to an employer having in place a system
for preventing and correcting harassment are further
enhanced if the employer also institutes mandatory employer
training programs in which workers are apprised of the
employer’s policies on harassment and their respective rights
and duties.237 In fact, courts have indicated that the mere
existence of anti-harassment policies is not enough, and that
training is essential to an effective defense.238 Moreover,
EEOC enforcement guidelines effectively encourage
employers to adopt written policies barring harassment and
outlining complaint procedures, to distribute these
periodically, and to train “all employees to ensure that they
understand their rights and responsibilities” under these
policies.239 Similarly, EEOC administrative rules on sexual
harassment emphasize that “[p]revention is the best tool”
and that employers should “take all steps necessary to
prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
235. See, e.g., Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 820-21 (6th Cir.
2013); Peace-Wickam v. Walls, 409 F. App’x. 512, 520-22 (3d Cir. 2010); Ocheltree
v. Scollon Prods., 335 F.3d 325, 334 (4th Cir. 2003). On the potential for
unenforced rules, not backed by training, to increase an employer’s exposure to
liability, see, for example, Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 777
(7th Cir. 2001).
236. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 875-76 (9th
Cir. 2001); Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 413 (3d Cir. 1997).
237. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999); Peace-Wickham,
409 F. App’x. at 520-22; Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 334-35.
238. See, e.g., Hill v. Children’s Vill., 196 F. Supp. 2d 389, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Miller v. Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026,
1029-30 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
239. U.S. EEOC, No. 915.002, V(C)(1), ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON VICARIOUS
EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS (1999),
http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html.
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harassment under title VII, and developing methods to
sensitize all concerned.”240 Finally, by law, some states
encourage employers to provide some form of harassment
training.241
Even before Ellerth and Faragher were decided, a
majority of employers—and virtually all large employers—
had already adopted anti-harassment policies.242 Today, they
are nearly universal. This effort to fight “bias with
bureaucracy,” to quote Frank Dobbin, represents the very
essence of bureaucratic control.243 The policies, which are
often inserted in employee handbooks, are invariably
embodied in formal, quasi-legal documents that, like law
itself, purport by their very existence to govern workers’
behavior. As we have already mentioned, they often employ
complaint procedures modeled after grievance mechanisms
in union contracts, albeit with none of the democratic
representation
implied
in
collective
bargaining
244
agreements.
Although invariably presented as essential tools for
complying with the law and safeguarding workers, these
policies are, at root, expressions of control. This is
particularly evident with regard to policies on sexual
harassment. As Vicki Schultz, among others, has pointed out,
from the very outset, MacKinnon herself spearheaded a drive
to define sexual harassment in a way that essentially
equated sexism with sexuality.245 Although obviously not
entirely compatible with the law, this expansive vision of
240. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2014).
241. Michael W. Johnson, Harassment and Discrimination Prevention Training:
What the Law Requires, 55 LAB. L.J. 119, 122 (2004).
242. As Frank Dobbin points out, in this respect, the Court in those cases merely
“ratified procedures that 95 percent of employers already had in place.” DOBBIN,
supra note 18, at 4; see also Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in an EEOC World, 89
IND. L.J. 115, 132 (2014).
243. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 101.
244. Id. at 197-99. To be sure, unions can cause employers to bargain over
harassment rules and procedures and union contracts do sometimes cover these
issues, but as union representation has retreated such contracts have become
very rare.
245. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 14, at 2081-83.
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sexual harassment has very much informed the meaning of
the concept for the media and the public.246 More importantly,
it has also defined the way the concept has been understood
and operationalized by many employers, who, as Schultz
documents, often go far beyond what the law requires in
controlling workers’ conduct: categorically banning sexual
jokes and innuendos, flirting, and “insensitive” behavior in
general.247 In the interest of prohibiting sexual harassment,
a substantial number of employers bar all amorous
relationships between workers, including those of equal
rank.248
An important respect in which anti-harassment policies
go quite beyond the kind of bureaucratic control envisaged by
Edwards is in the way they are administered in training. 249
As Dobbin argues, as early as the 1960s, many employers had
already begun to institute “sensitivity” and “diversity”
246. See id. at 2083-84.
247. See id. at 2091-92, 2094-99.
248. According to one recent survey, over 40% of employers had some kind of
policy banning workplace romances. Workplace Romance Survey, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (Sept. 14, 2013), www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/
articles/pages/shrm-workplace-romance-findings.aspx; see also Schultz, The
Sanitized Workplace, supra note 14, at 2124-29; Dana Wilkie, Workplace Is No
Place for Romance, HR MAG., Dec. 2013, at 13 (referencing the SHRM Workplace
Romance Survey: “more than one in 10 (12 percent) [of employers] won’t even
allow workers in different departments to pair up.”). Human Resource and
Management publications often specifically counsel the adoption of such policies
as a means of evading liability. See, e.g., Nolan C. Lickey et al., Responding to
Workplace Romance: A Proactive and Pragmatic Approach, 8 J. BUS. INQ. 100,
110-17 (2009); Cindy M. Schaefer & Thomas R. Tudor, Managing Workplace
Romances, 66 SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J. 4, 4-6, 8 (2001); Romance in the
Workplace Poses Possible Legal Problems, FAIR EMP. PRAC. GUIDELINES, July 1,
2001, at 5. A search of the internet yields numerous examples of human relations
consultant companies that encourage employers to guard against such
relationships and adopt policies restricting them. See, e.g., Managing Office
Romance: Does Your Company Need an Anti-Fraternization Workplace Policy?,
AVONTIS (Feb. 9, 2012, 3:28 PM), www.avontisgroup.com/blog?p=104; NonFraternization—Do You Have an HR Policy?, INSIGHT PERFORMANCE (Mar. 29,
2010),
http://insightperformance.com/non-fraternization-do-you-have-an-hrpolicy.
249. See generally RICHARD EDWARDS, Bureaucratic Control: Policy No. 1.1, in
CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 130, 130-62 (1979).
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training, although at the time mainly for supervisors and
managers, and mainly with an emphasis on race.250 By the
1990s, these programs encompassed sexual harassment.251
By the late 1990s, sexual harassment had become their focus;
70% of corporations had harassment training systems in
place and the programs were applied broadly to all
employees.252 In fact, in proof of a different way that
capitalism has shaped Title VII’s approach to workplace
inequality, an industry has emerged to provide employers
with an assortment of live trainers, training videos, and
online programs.253 An important point to note in weighing
their dysfunctions is that there is very little evidence that
these training programs actually reduce rates of harassment
and some evidence to suggest that they have important
negative effects in this regard, including promoting backlash,
a de-legitimated concept of harassment, and a false sense of
remediation.254
In the name of discouraging harassment in general, these
training sessions are designed to impose on workers a
program of continuous self-monitoring, underpinned by
implicit norms of suspicion and adversity. This approach,
which Schultz calls the “cultural sensitivity” approach in
contrast to the “zero-tolerance” approach,255 is particularly
pernicious in that its mandate of self-monitoring and selfdiscipline (as Edwards noticed of bureaucratic control in
general) explicitly shifts the employer’s project of workplace
control onto workers themselves. Each worker oppresses
herself, with no direct compensation for doing so. Indeed,
employers frequently impose on all workers, not just
managers and supervisors, an obligation that they report to
management any acts of harassment they know about or
250. See DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 144-46.
251. See id. at 147-49.
252. See id. at 191; see also Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 14, at
2094-95 n.96.
253. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches With Sledgehammers: The
Questionable Embrace of Employee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal
Profession, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 125, 126, 133 (2002).
254. For a review of the literature on this question, see id. at 142-44.
255. Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 14, at 2099-103.
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even suspect to have occurred. In ironic throwback to one of
the most pernicious methods of union busting, such
mandatory reporting rules effectively require that workers
spy on each other. With similar irony, the practice parallels
the stratagem by which employers seek to nominate workers
as supervisors or managers in order to cleave them from
other workers, to deprive them of the protections of the
National Labor Relations Act and, sometimes, to frustrate
workers’ attempts to construct functional bargaining units.256
The potential for these practices to violate the labor law,
though significant, is but one aspect of a broader conflict
between workplace harassment rules and worker solidarity.
Even where they do not violate the labor law, such rules
preempt interactions that are, even if not immediate
expressions of worker solidarity, quite often the foundation
of truly solidary behavior. Both statistical and qualitative
research, as well as anecdotal observations, confirm that
intimate contact between workers in the workplace is
absolutely integral to successful union organizing.257 Flirting,
horseplay, joke-telling, bull sessions, and other activities that
are prohibited in the name of mitigating harassment, form
part of the fabric out of which rank-and-file solidarity must
be woven. These activities are integral for precisely the same
reasons that make them unprofessional and deviant: of their
nature, they establish among workers an identity, a set of
interests, and an ethos all independent of the employer’s, and
they provide a space in which workers can develop and
express trust and familiarity. These dynamics are crucial, for
although organizing drives are not as physically dangerous
256. To be sure, employer rules that impinge on workers’ protected rights to
engage in “concerted activity,” which includes but is not necessarily limited to
forming, joining, or assigning in the running of a union, may well be prohibited
by the National Labor Relations Act. See Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, 475 F.3d
369, 372-74, 380-81 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Beyond the fact that such rights have become
notoriously difficult to vindicate is the broader problem that such rules may
impinge on conduct that is not protected because it is attenuated from protected
concerted activity, but is nonetheless important to the development of solidarity.
257. For both a review of the research on this question as well as specific
research in support of this thesis, see Kate Bronfenbrenner & Robert Hickey,
Changing to Organize: A National Assessment of Union Strategies, in ORGANIZING
AND ORGANIZERS: REBUILDING LABOR 17 (Ruth Milkman & Kim Voss, eds., 2004).
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as they were in the 1930s, they remain contentious and risky
affairs. Employers are adept at cultivating anti-union
“solidarity” among anti-union workers.258 Union supporters
are regularly harassed, disciplined, or fired by employers. 259
And the labor law, weakened doctrinally and by the erosion
of the very solidarity it purports to protect, often affords few
effective remedies in these cases.260 In such a context, it is
absolutely essential that workers forge bonds of the kind that
are difficult to build where the workplace has been, in
Schultz’s words, so sanitized.
It goes without saying that jokes and bull sessions and
such are not always conducive to constructive forms of
worker solidarity; that they can indeed be oppressive to
women and minorities; and that in this fashion, they can also
undermine solidarity. Nevertheless, the more important
point is that even the best workplace harassment rules are
not devised by employers with any idea of maintaining a
foundation of worker solidarity. Quite the contrary: even in
their most justifiable form, these rules inevitably affirm the
authority of the employer as the protector of workers from
each other’s dysfunctions and depredations. Such is essential
to their basic structure and grammar: workers—
“employees,” “associates,” and “team members”—are
prohibited from inflicting various harms on others, on pain of
the employer stepping in and disciplining, even firing the
offending worker. Workers are each other’s enemies, and
employers, their protectors. Often enough, this dynamic is
further heightened by wrapping the rules in the language of
“diversity” and “inclusion,” the importance of “teamwork,”
and the value of a “safe” environment—paternalistic rhetoric
that is the modern cognate of the old “company family
concept.”
258. Robert A. Penney, Workers Against Unions: Union Organizing and AntiUnion Countermobilizations, in REBUILDING LABOR: ORGANIZING AND ORGANIZERS
IN THE NEW UNION MOVEMENT, supra note 257, at 88-95.
259. See JOHN T. DUNLOP, U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, FACT
FINDING REPORT: COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS 84-85 (1994); Michael Goldfield, Labor in American Politics—Its
Current Weakness, 48 J. POL. 2, 9-10 (1986).
260. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to SelfOrganization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-94 (1983); see also
GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 13.
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All of this conceals the fact that, although these rules
ostensibly benefit workers, and although they may indeed
accrue to workers’ advantage in many cases, their most direct
beneficiary is the employer. In fact, harassment training
sessions themselves are important displays of employer
sovereignty over workers, not least because they are
mandatory, “captive audience” affairs, and their scheduling
and content remain entirely within the control of the
employer. Typically inane and annoying, they too allow the
employer to present itself as an agent for protecting workers
against one another in the course of asserting its prerogative
to rule the workplace. Often based, like harassment rules, on
overly-broad views of what is prohibited by the law and
conveyed with the intent to scare their audience with the
prospect of job loss, these sessions enhance divisions among
workers in very palpable ways.261
These practices are all hallmarks of a program of
bureaucratic control that is most fully realized when the
rules are actually deployed to discipline or fire workers
outright. Although recent data is not available, it appears
that employers typically discipline the targets of harassment
complaints, despite the fact that many such complaints
involve conduct that would not actually give rise to a viable
claim against the employer.262 The indecorous image of a
worker being escorted out of the workplace because she has
been fired for harassment—or even that of a worker being
compelled to attend remedial training sessions—may well
advance some laudable goal, including the deterrence of
harassment by others. But this image also reaffirms the basic
sovereignty of the employer in the workplace and their
position as defender of workers from each other. Whatever
benefits are realized come at the expense of all workers being
261. For instance, one veteran anti-harassment trainer describes how almost
every harassment training video she is familiar with attempts to “scare” workers
into compliance, and how the nearly inevitable result of this is heightened conflict
between workers and a more divided workforce. Rita Risser, Sexual Harassment
Training: Truth and Consequences, 53 TRAINING & DEV., Aug. 1999, at 21, 23. On
the intent to frighten workers in these sessions, see Schultz, The Sanitized
Workplace, supra note 14, at 2100-01.
262. At least, this appears to be the case with sexual harassment complaints.
See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, supra note 14, at 2104-05.
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subject to a telling display of the awesome power that
employers possess—in this instance, backed, apparently, by
the law, which rewards employers for swift and punitive
action.263
The prerogative that harassment charges provide
employers to discipline or fire workers underlies another,
very specific way in which this legal regime abets the erosion
of worker solidarity. Such charges are often invoked by
employers to justify disciplinary action against workers
where this otherwise appears to constitute illegal
discrimination or coercion in violation of section 7 and section
8 of the National Labor Relations Act. Often, such claims are
dismissed as pretexts by the NLRB, but not always.264 In
2005, a majority panel of the Board overturned a ruling by
an administrative law judge and let stand the discharge of a
worker who was active in union organizing on the basis of the
employer’s claim that the worker had violated its sexual
harassment policy. It did so despite its own
acknowledgement that the employer was also motivated by
an unlawful intent to violate the worker’s rights under the
labor law—and also, as a dissenting member complained,
despite ample evidence that the horseplay that constituted
the violation was rampant in the workplace and generally
tolerated.265 In 2000, another Board majority overturned an
administrative law judge to uphold an employer’s discipline
of two workers, despite acknowledged evidence that it was
motivated by unlawful anti-union animus, because the
majority concluded that the workers’ use of foul language to
describe managers and workers who were unsupportive of
the union was “intimidating and scaring the women.”266
263. See Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The
Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—
A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1549-57 (1999); Mark
McLaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment
Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 412 (1998).
264. See, e.g., Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 109, (May 2, 2013);
United Parcel Serv., 327 N.L.R.B. 317, 319-21 (1998); Radisson Muehlebach
Hotel, 273 N.L.R.B. 1464, 1475-76 (1985).
265. Krystal Enters. Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 227, 227-31 (2005).
266. Fixtures Mfg. Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 565, 566 (2000). In particular, they
credited the employer’s assertion that the women:
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Again, a dissenting member (the same, actually, as in the
2005 case) noted that the employer appeared to have little
interest in enforcing its harassment policy—except to justify
disciplining these workers.267
These critical observations about the pernicious
functions of anti-harassment programs are consistent not
only with Edwards’ investigations, but also with the
conclusions of sociologists who contend that diversity policies
and procedures are implemented in ways that routinely align
with the interests of employers. Consistent with Dobbin’s
account of how employers appropriated and bureaucratized
the project of workplace equality, a number of researchers
find that anti-harassment policies have often been embraced
by employers as “good for business.”268 A closer look at how
these programs operate reveals why this is so.
Although very little research has been done on the actual
nature of harassment (or “diversity”) training—in part
because access is so difficult to obtain—what has been
managed is instructive.269 For instance, Susan Munkres’
study of supervisor training revealed that the “trainers take
it as a given that the supervisors will not engage in
were offended by his [a worker named Sheall] calling employees “mother
fucking chicken shits” and various members of management “chicken
shit” and “mother fucking chicken shit.” Lackey also testified that
several women complained to her about Hoff’s “foul language.” They told
her Hoff was “obscene,” that they did not like to hear what he was saying,
that they were “offended,” and that “they felt threatened by him.” They
told Lackey that they heard Hoff saying “[Y]ou can see who’s got the
fucking balls—they wear the [Union] pins.”
Id.
267. Id. at 566 n.14. Cf. NAPA Ambulance Serv., Inc., Case 20-CA-26832,
1997 WL 33316037 (N.L.R.B. Div. of Judges) (Apr. 15, 1997) (noting that the
employer took necessary and proper steps to enforce its sexual harassment
policy).
268. See, e.g., Meredith Ann Newman, Sexual Harassment and Productivity: It’s
Not Just a U.S. Problem, 19 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 172, 178-79 (1995);
Jana L. Raver & Michele J. Gelfand, Beyond the Individual Victim: Linking
Sexual Harassment, Team Processes, and Team Performance, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J.
387, 395 (2005).
269. On the paucity of research and difficulties in conducting it, see Susan A.
Munkres, Claiming “Victim” to Harassment Law: Legal Consciousness of the
Privileged, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 447, 453 (2008).
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harassment or discrimination”; instead, they exhorted the
supervisors to control their subordinates.270 Significantly, the
trainers led their subjects to see “supervisors as rightspromoters rather than . . . workers as rights-claimants.”271
Although Munkres argues that this represented a positive
step in subverting the “resistance” of supervisors,272 for us her
findings are significant in showing how such training is
geared to affirming hierarchy and authority.
Lauren Edelman argued early on (before the advantages
to employers of harassment training and rules had been
clearly affirmed by courts), on the basis of a survey of several
hundred employers, that employers approach their
obligations under Title VII with the aim of “minimiz[ing]
law’s encroachment on managerial power,” and that they
achieve this via their institutional capacity to “mediate” the
meaning of the law in how they manage compliance.273
Consistent with Judith Stein’s criticism, Edelman contends
that this prerogative stems in large part from the law’s
ambiguity and the way it was designed to depend on private
litigation for enforcement.274 Moreover, Edelman’s later
survey (with two co-authors) of procedures at a small sample
of large employers in the early 1990s found that the
procedures functioned as a means of privatizing civil rights
in a manner that ultimately subordinated “legal goals” to
“managerial goals,” including that of “attaining a productive
business environment with good working relationships and
high
employee
morale.”275
Edelman’s
subsequent
examination of managerial literature, this time after Ellerth
and Faragher (and with a different group of co-authors) found
more evidence of the re-articulation of anti-harassment and
civil rights norms to advance managerial interests.276 The
main concern for Edelman and her coauthors in every one of
these works was the potential “dilution” of legal rights. But
270. Id. at 454-56.
271. Id. at 448, 454-58.
272. Id. at 456-58.
273. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity, supra note 18, at 1535-36.
274. See id. at 1536-41.
275. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution, supra note 18, at 511, 529.
276. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 1615-18.
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what interests us is how this research confirms the intuition
that employers consistently reduce the mandates of
harassment law to their own interests and their own program
of bureaucratic control of the workplace.
It might be tempting to say in response to these
criticisms that the real problem lies with the fact that
harassment policies and training programs may be used by
employers in defending against harassment claims in the
first place, and not with the law as such. But this is actually
not so. For it is difficult to imagine a system of liability in
coworker harassment cases that would not feature such
defenses and in turn inspire these responses among
employers. It is at least difficult to contemplate a system of
this kind that is also remotely fair and yet consistent with
the adversarial and individualistic character of the entire
Title VII regime. Indeed, as Dobbin has argued, in rough
alignment with Edwards’ thesis, Title VII prefigured the
devolution of the authority to decide when and how to enforce
the law to managers, or “personnel experts,” precisely
because the drafters of the Act eschewed the activist,
independent administrative approach, modeled on the NLRB
and championed by labor officials, in favor of one that is not
only adversarial and individualistic but institutionally
unable to operationalize its norms without managers playing
this central role.277
For Dobbin, this all reflects “the paradox of a weak state”
marked by the fragmentation of government power and the
relative lack of authority of government compared to
corporations.278 But as critical theorist Franz Neumann once
observed, the idea of the weak State distracts from an
appreciation of its true role in class society as a capable
guardian of capitalist interests and ideology, and an arbiter
of competing claims among the powerful: “The liberal state
has always been as strong as the political and social situation
and the interests of society demanded . . . . It has been a
strong state precisely in those spheres in which it had to be

277. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 5-6.
278. See id. at 6-7.
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strong and in which it wanted to be strong.”279 In this light,
Dobbin’s more specific point, that the peculiar structure of
the state in America “opened the government to invasion” by
those seeking influence, rings truer.280 So does Stein’s
suggestion that this legacy of Title VII reflects exactly the
values of those who successfully worked to shape its
meaning.281 In other words, the law was designed by its
champions in Congress, the White House, and the Civil
Rights movement with at least an indifference to how it
might aggrandize the power of employers. And this is what
has happened.
CONCLUSION
LIBERALISM AGAINST LABOR
In the opening chapter of his popular 1991 book, Which
Side Are You On?, labor lawyer and journalist Thomas
Geoghegan reflects bitterly on mainstream liberalism’s quiet
contempt for the very notion of worker solidarity.282 Liberals,
even self-professed radicals, he said, “have more in common
with Reagan” than with the labor movement, while Lane
Kirkland, then president of the AFL-CIO and much reviled
by labor radicals for his conservatism, was nevertheless
“outside the American consensus in a way that even Abbie
Hoffman never was.”283 Indeed, Geoghegan then quotes with
obvious approval a radical friend’s observations on
Kirkland’s predecessor George Meany, an even more
conservative man who was the very personification of the
postwar bureaucratization of the labor movement: “You
know, I feel much closer to Meany, whom I despise, than a lot
of the liberals. He might be right-wing, but if the crunch
really came, you could count on Meany, like you couldn’t

279. FRANZ NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern Society, in
THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22, 22 (1957).
280. DOBBIN, supra note 18, at 19.
281. See id. at 44-49, 52-55.
282. See generally THOMAS GEOGHEGAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? TRYING TO BE
(2004).

FOR LABOR WHEN IT’S FLAT ON ITS BACK

283. Id. at 7.

1136

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

count on any liberals . . . .”284 For Geoghegan, liberalism’s
apathy to solidarity is congenital—“Emerson, Thoreau, all
these guys are scabs.”285
The genealogy of American liberalism’s hostility to
solidarity is something this Article certainly speaks to. By
the most obvious markers, worker solidarity has definitely
been in decline in this country for some time. Since Title VII
was enacted, union membership in America has declined to
levels not seen since the 1920s—falling from nearly 35% of
the private sector, non-agricultural workforce in 1954 to only
7.5% in 2013.286 Major strikes, which annually averaged in
the hundreds from the 1930s into the mid-1970s, have
diminished nearly to the point of disappearance, with only a
few dozen, at most, in recent years.287 A major reason for this
is that strikes often end in failure—so often, in fact, that
employers frequently bait unions into striking for the
purpose of replacing strikers with strikebreakers.288 Union
organizing activity has also faltered, as has organizing
success. In the early 1960s when Title VII came about, unions
won nearly 60% of NLRB-sponsored representation elections;
by the 1980s, that figure slipped below 50%.289 And while the
success rate for unions has rebounded in recent years, this
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. On declining union membership, see MAYER, supra note 116, at 22-23
tbl.A1; LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., ECON. POL’Y INST., THE STATE OF WORKING
AMERICA 269 fig.4AC (12th ed. 2012), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/
subjects/wages/?reader; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
U.S.: 1980, at 429 no. 714 (101st ed. 1980); Goldfield, supra note 259, at 3 fig.1;
News Release, BLS (Jan. 24, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
archives/union2_01242014.pdf.
287. On declining strikes, see News Release, BLS (Feb. 12, 2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkstp_02122014.pdf; see also BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 2001, at 410 no.636 (121st ed.
2002); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.: 1991, at 423
no.694 (111th ed. 1991).
288. See Ruth A. Bandzak, The Strike as Management Strategy, 26 J. ECON.
ISSUES 645, 653-54 (1992); see also TOM JURAVICH & KATE BRONFENBRENNER,
RAVENSWOOD: THE STEELWORKERS VICTORY AND THE REVIVAL OF AMERICAN LABOR
37-38 (1999).
289. See DUNLOP, supra note 259, at 81 Exhibit III-1.
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actually reflects deeper difficulties in organizing, as the
number of elections has fallen to less than half the number
in 1990 and less than one-quarter the number in the early
1960s.290
As the simultaneous deterioration in labor standards and
the social and political standing of the working class since the
1970s make clear, this retreat of labor activism has little to
do with the notion, implicit in arguments about the
obsolescence of unions and such, that exploitation and
alienation in the workplace have been largely conquered. 291
Rather, just as the explosive unionization in the 1930s and
1940s reflected the crisis of hierarchical and technical forms
of control during that era, what has happened over the last
several decades reveals, above all, employers’ success in
reestablishing their control of the workplace. To be sure, a
number of other factors have obviously contributed to the
retrenchment of unionism and labor activism, including
deindustrialization, a hostile political and legal climate, a
renewed offensive by employers, and the institutional
deficiencies of the labor movement.292 And other factors no
doubt have altered the way employers pursue such control.
But as our review of the history of employer control makes
very clear, effective worker solidarity is a crucial mediating
factor in deciding workers’ ability to challenge employers’
sovereignty and contest the terms of exploitation. These
observations lead us back to Title VII. A postwar workplace
in which bureaucratized union governance imposed on
worker solidarity, while nonetheless continuing to rely on it
to hold in check employers’ appetite for control, has been
replaced by one in which the realization of Title VII’s
program much more completely undermines the foundations

290. See id.; 74 NLRB ANN. REP. 125 tbl.13 (2009). Compare 30 NLRB ANN. REP.
192 tbl.10 (1966), with NLRB, Disposition of Election Petitions Closed in FY14,
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections/
disposition-election-petitions-closed-fy14 (last visited Sept. 7, 2015).
291. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 286, at 181 tbl.4.2, 184 tbl.4.3, 186 tbl.4.4,
189 tbl.4.5; CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2012, at 5 fig.1, 7 tbl.1, 13 fig.4, 18 tbl.5 (2013).
292. For a review of this question, see LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION, supra
note 119, at 212-45 (2002); Goldfield, supra note 259, at 6-8.
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of worker solidarity while directly legitimating and
promoting the most pernicious forms of employer control.
This conclusion has important implications for debates
about the relationship between employment law and the
rights of individual workers, on the one hand, and labor law
and labor rights, on the other. Employment law scholars have
long claimed that the expansion of individual rights in the
workplace, spearheaded by the passage of Title VII, has
negated the need for labor law, unions, and other collective
modes of advancing workers’ interests in the workplace.
More recently, liberal scholars in this vein have taken to
arguing that such laws’ program of individual rights could be
used to accomplish what the labor law no longer seems able
to do: to nurture, support, and ultimately reinvigorate the
labor movement.293 Others have argued more prosaically that
employment laws like Title VII inevitably advance the cause
of collective labor rights simply by rolling back employers’
prerogatives to discipline or fire individual workers.294 What
this Article suggests is that employment law, and Title VII
in particular, have not so much negated the need for unions
and labor law as helped erode their foundations; that the idea
of using such laws to reinvigorate the labor movement is
misconceived; and that impositions on the doctrine of
employment-at-will via laws like Title VII are not necessarily
zero-sum deductions from employers’ power in the workplace.
In fact, far from augmenting the labor law, what Title VII
has actually done is invert the logic of the labor law in the
course of serving very different interests. Although not a
radical regime by any means, the National Labor Relations
Act was enacted with the express intention of diminishing
employer sovereignty in the interest of worker solidarity. It
accomplished this in both functional and highly symbolic
ways, including by limiting employers’ speech and forcing
them to suffer the return to the workplace of people they had
fired for concerted activity, as well as requiring employers to
bargain in good faith with workers over the terms and
conditions of employment. Title VII, as we have seen, has
293. See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2685, 2687, 2721, 2744 (2008).
294. For a critical review of this perspective, see LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE
UNION, supra note 119, at 207-11.
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served opposite ends in opposite ways. Enacted with a
narrow view of the kind of employer control it would
endeavor to restrain, an even narrower view of how this
might be accomplished, and an indifference to how, in fact,
its program might actually augment employers’ power, Title
VII has indeed affirmed and justified employers’ sovereignty
to the detriment of worker solidarity. It is the embodiment in
law and policy of Geoghegan’s depiction of liberalism.
Liberalism, in turn, has subordinated class to an
individualistic and legalistic framework of workers rights—
thus its attempt to reduce class to a species of bias, an artifact
of discrimination cognizable in the uselessly subjective and
absurdly symmetrical concept of “classism.” The roots of this
turn have come into clearer focus in recent years. Historians,
including Jefferson Cowie, have documented how the same
contest between civil rights liberals and representatives of
organized labor that shaped Title VII, culminated in the
years that followed in a realignment of the Democratic Party
and postwar liberalism more generally, along lines that
favored identity politics and the claims of minorities and
women, over class politics and the interests of organized
labor and the working class.295 Not coincidentally, the 1970s
and 1980s, in which Title VII devolved into a venue of
employer control and an engine of conflict among workers,
were also a period in which the ethos of liberalism changed,
jettisoning an earlier accommodation with class
consciousness and collective interests in favor of a program,
defined, like Title VII itself, by individualism, private
litigation, and a therapeutic sensibility.296 In this political
and cultural context, labor rights and worker solidarity
proved easy targets for employers, politicians, and judges. It
was no coincidence either that the period after Title VII
“brought forth a dual movement: the revolution in minority
and women’s occupational rights took place at the same time
as the counter-revolution in labor rights.”297
The developments described in this Article are at once an
expression of this political realignment and a particular
295. See COWIE, supra note 182, at 236-37; STEIN, PIVOTAL DECADE, supra note
189.
296. See COWIE, supra note 182, at 213-21.
297. Id. at 239.
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example of how liberalism’s turn away from class and toward
identity has imprinted itself in law and policy and the
everyday conditions of the workplace. Indeed, they reveal the
self-perpetuating nature of this process. For just as Title VII
advances bureaucratic control and undermines worker
solidarity, the decay of worker solidarity results in a further
erosion of unions and working class activism, leaving
workers even more vulnerable to employers’ assertions of
authority. Such is the ironic synergy in the workplace of
individualism and individual rights with employer
paternalism.
In this fashion, Title VII has provided employers with a
way of undermining unions and labor rights, and
consolidating their control of the workplace, not only covertly
and in a paternalistic guise, but in a fashion that is
legitimated and justified by a liberalism now dominated by
identity politics. It allows employers, with the pretense of
keeping workers safe from other workers, to protect their
interests from workers generally and to make their
workplaces safer from capitalism. And it allows liberals to
express their supposed support for workers perversely, by
endorsing employers’ power over those workers. In all these
ways, Title VII has been proved as reactionary and
dysfunctional in its implications as the advocates of a
different approach worried would happen fifty years ago. In
their prescience about Title VII, those critical voices from the
ranks of organized labor and an older brand of postwar
liberalism revealed an understanding of the dangers of
liberalism’s turn in law and politics from class to identity, one
that people who call themselves liberals or progressives and
presume to care about workers would do well to reflect on
today.

